The use of military force to promote human rights
James D. Meernik, Steven C. Poe, and
Erum Shaikh
Introduction
Among the major, stated goals of the military action in Iraq has been the US administration’s desire to replace the Saddam Hussein dictatorship with a regime that would serve as a model for human rights and democracy in the Middle East. Thought controversial by many because it may represent a bad precedent, as well as a sea change in American foreign policy, the use of force for these purposes is really not that unusual in a broad historical context. Throughout history, states have frequently used military force to impose political systems upon other societies. Owen (2002: 375) chronicled 198 such cases that have occurred since 1555. And like the current case, most such efforts have involved the forceful imposition of a regime by a powerful country on a weaker target state.
And in most of these the powerful state has sought to impose on the target country a set of political institutions that more closely resembles its own.
The extent to which such uses of force have been successful at bringing about more human rights in societies is debatable. Scholars are now beginning to analyze the success of attempts to impose liberal, democratic systems on nations (Fossedal 1989; Smith 1994; Peceny 1995, 1999; Meernik 1996; McDougall 1997; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Whitcomb 1998). Such research has emphasized the extent to which a system of democratic governance has been established in a nation whose prior regime did not subscribe to democratic norms. These analyses have largely focused on macro-level, systemic and constitutional changes in government institutions.
We are interested, however, in exploring the degree to which these uses of force have been able to effect change at the micro, or individual level. While regime change may presage an improvement of conditions in a society, the changes may only be in law and not in fact. The procedural aspects of democratization may be realized in the course of these military interventions, as new constitutions are written and elections held. Yet the substance of democracy may lag behind if elected officials and citizens do not fully subscribe to critical, democratic norms such as civil liberties, tolerance, and the foreswearance of violence as a political tool.
160
One aim of this chapter is to provide the first assessment of whether these uses of force have acted to improve the substance of democracy – the right to speak one’s own mind, to practice one’s religion and simply to live peacefully, free of the fear of imprisonment and government-sponsored violence. As such, this study also constitutes a useful addition to the literature that seeks to ascertain the relationship between human rights and a variety of foreign policy tools (e.g., Stohl Carleton and Johnson 1984, Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Regan 1995; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Blanton 1994; 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Given the fact that the literature has examined the impact of foreign economic and military aid and arms transfers in some detail, it is rather surprising that no one has yet systematically analyzed the relationship between human rights and US uses of force, which are arguably the most serious of foreign policy commitments, and certainly the most visible. Most importantly of all, we seek to deepen our understanding of one of the key elements of a sustainable peace in nations that have undergone conflict – their level of human rights protection. Governments that abuse their citizens’ human rights may well be more likely to experience repeated patterns of internal and/or external forms of violence and conflict.
Their abusive policies may precipitate challenges from within and attempts from without to impose a new government more respectful of human rights. Thus, evaluating the extent to which uses of force result in an improvement of the human rights situation in the target state is critical to understanding the prospects of a sustainable peace in that society.
Toward this end, we will examine uses of force by the United States across all nations of the world, using data for the period 1977–1996. We find that the regimes that are subjected to uses of force by the United States are a distinct set of nations, distinguished from others by their regime types. Having examined which nations the USA has used force in, we next analyze our primary question of interest: the impact of such military
actions on the lives of people in the target nation. We argue that if US uses of force are indeed successful at promoting human rights, then the success or failure of uses of force is apt to be a function of their type, size, and duration.
Our findings indicate that though democracy and human rights are among the considerations that determine whether the USA does intervene in a particular case, these uses of force are ineffective at promoting improvements in these conditions.
Explaining the use of military force by the United States
To explain the consequences of US uses of military force, we begin by examining the events to which the USA is responding. We make one seemingly obvious, but important assumption – that United States foreign policymakers are more interested in some foreign crises than others. Our
161
purpose is not to enumerate all the types of events and conditions that make some events of concern to US foreign policymakers and not others.
Instead, we seek to explain how a nation’s domestic political system and regime policies affect US foreign policy toward that nation. Are US foreign policymakers’ perceptions of the importance of a threat posed by some nation influenced in any degree by these domestic, political conditions in that country? And do such interests increase the likelihood that the United States will use military force to influence events in these nations? We believe the answer to both questions to be “yes.” The first step in our analysis of the relationship between human rights and the use of force is to explain why we believe internal political conditions influence the likelihood of US military action.
The promotion of liberalism and the US use of force
The United States has long been interested in promoting liberalist values in its foreign policies (Fossedal 1989; Smith 1994; Peceny 1995, 1999; Meernik 1996; McDougall 1997; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Whitcomb1998). In contrast to realists, who would argue that promoting democracy or human rights is rare in a security-oriented, anarchic international system, many of these scholars have found that the United States has increasingly used force to remake other societies. This is not altogether surprising for other researchers have argued that there are substantial opportunities and incentives for a powerful state to remake the world in its own image (Krasner 1978: 340) and to socialize leaders in other states to its norms and values (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Indeed, even Hans Morgenthau (1973: 10) once wrote, “All nations are tempted—and few have been able to resist the temptation for long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.”
Recent research by Owen (2002) confirms that states have forcibly imposed domestic institutions on other states throughout history. Ideologically inspired military interventions have seemingly become more feasible
and prevalent with the end of the Cold War, but as Peceny (1999) demonstrates, the USA embarked on such missions during and before the Cold War as well. Peceny finds that in almost one-third of US military interventions in the twentieth century, presidents sought to achieve liberal democratic aims abroad. Most recently, one of the five major objectives of US military strategy in the Annual Defense Report 2000 is fostering an international environment in which “Democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted.”1
First, we hypothesize that the United States will be interested in the extent to which a nation subscribes to liberal, democratic values.
The democratic peace research program has shown that democratic regimes tend not to make war on each other (Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). More recently, scholars are finding
162
that when democracies do enter conflicts, it is often because they are targeted by non-democratic states (Leeds and Davis 1999; Prins and Sprecher 1999). Democratic regimes also tend to be more co-operative in general in
their international behavior (Benoit 1996; Leeds and Davis 1999). Huth (1998) finds that major powers are more likely to intervene in conflicts when they are seeking to protect a politically similar regime from a third nation that does not share their polity characteristics. Polity type is highly predictive of how states treat one another because of the tendency for like states to flock together because of shared norms.
Second, and more importantly, we believe that the specific policies pursued by governments should also explain their proclivity for conflict involvement and the likelihood that the USA will use force against them.
Governments that are fair and responsive to their citizens do not provoke the scope or intensity of opposition that generates unrest at home and escalates into conflict with other regimes. For example, the states of
Europe tend not to provoke militarized, international crises by their policies toward their own citizens, while some governments in Africa and Asia have become enmeshed in crises because of their repressive nature.
Regimes that do not respect the human rights of their citizens are also typical of regimes that centralize power and possess far greater latitude to act repressively at home and aggressively abroad. Ultimately, repression and/or aggression are at the hub of most international crises and uses of force, and so we should find those states whose regimes utilize these tools as normal political practice will be the site of many of these crises of interest to the United States, and therefore will be targeted with military force.
Hypothesis 1: The United States will be more likely to use force the less democratic the target state.2
Hypothesis 2: The United States will be more likely use force the less respectful the target state is toward its citizens’ human rights.3
Initial bivariate explorations
The dependent variable, FORCE, is coded “1” for each country in the world for each year in which the USA used force and “0” otherwise in the period 1976–1996. Data on the political use of force were gathered from Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Job and Ostrom (1986), Zelikow (1987),
The Center for Naval Analyses: ‘The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990’, and the Global Security web site.4 A political use of military force short of war is defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978: 12) as physical actions . . . taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national
163
authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. Empirically-oriented researchers are well aware that viewing simple bivariate relationships can sometimes lead to erroneous conclusions, as seemingly important relationships can appear that are in fact spurious, or alternatively, that significant relationships can be hidden (i.e., Lewis-Beck 1980). However, the old maxim that “a picture is worth a thousand words” has a certain appeal, and our experience has taught us that sometimes simple visual analyses can lead to a greater understanding of patterns in the data than would be possible from the inspection of multivariate analyses
alone.
By examining figures that show trends in countries’ levels of democracy, and respect for human rights, we can gain an idea of the likelihood that hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by data. In Figure 8.1 we depict the average Polity III democracy scores (a scale ranging from 0–10) during the time period under study, in years prior to US uses of force, at time t.
Figure 8.1 paints an interesting picture of the relationship between democracy and US military actions. The mean democracy scores in cases where US actions were to later occur are much lower than those to be found in countries where no such use of force would happen. Six years prior to an impending US military action, the average democracy score was just under 0.4, very near the bottom of the democracy scale. Democracy scores in other countries at that time, and across the period were by no means stellar, with means of around 3.5 to 4, on the bottom half of the scale, but they were substantially greater than in the countries where the USA was to later intervene, and statistically significantly (p<0.001).
Also interesting are the trends in both series across time. One sees an
164
upward trend in democracy in both series, indicative of a global trend toward democratization during this period of time. The upward trend in democracy is somewhat greater among nations that would later experience a US use of force, perhaps because countries on the “0” end of the Polity Democracy spectrum cannot possibly see decreases in their democracy scores, whereas a certain percentage of cases achieving higher scores are apt to do so. The mean democracy score at the time of the use of force is 1.26, as compared to 3.89 in cases where the USA does not use force, a difference which is still highly significant (p<0.001). We can conclude from
this analysis, then, that the US tends to use force in a subset of cases that are very low in democracy, a finding consistent with Hypothesis 1. Further, when one examines the overall trend toward democracy one may also notice that the progress tends to halt one year prior to US military actions, as the democracy scores actually decrease from 1.08 to 1.05 from t_2 to t_1. Admittedly this decrease is very small, but it is suggestive that perhaps in some instances US uses of force could result from downturns in democracy, in addition to levels in that variable at a particular point in time. In Figure 8.2 we present trends in human rights scores, as measured by the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale, which ranges from 1 to 5 (where “1” is best for human rights practices and “5” is “worst”), and deals primarily with “personal integrity rights,” the right not to be imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, executed, or murdered, either arbitrarily or for one’s views. Here we see that countries that would experience US military actions are indeed substantially more repressive than others in the period leading up to that event.
As in our first figure, differences between
165
the group experiencing uses of force and those that did not are statistically significant throughout the period (p<0.001).
The trend in human rights abuses is also suggestive, as one sees substantial increases in human rights abuses leading up to the military action, from 3.26, six years prior to the use of force; to 3.52 two years prior; 3.55, one year prior; and to 3.64 in the year of the military action. It does appear that the United States uses force in a subset of countries with rather undemocratic institutions and practices. However, though such analyses are suggestive, they are subject to difficulties since potentially important relationships with other explanations of the US use of force may have been overlooked.
The effects of US military actions on human rights: initial bivariate examination of trends
Now we consider the effects of US military actions on human rights. Our first analysis of this issue, which is presented in Figure 8.3, allows us to examine the evolution of human rights practices in the six years subsequent to US interventions, taking place at time t. We look at the level of respect for human rights, in US uses of force in general. However, the effects of uses of force might differ, depending on what kind of force is used, and the number of forces committed. We might theorize that, if one of the purposes of the US use of force is to increase respect for human rights, as indicated in the analyses conducted above, the use of ground forces represents an important threshold in terms of the level of commitment, and that uses of force that cross that threshold are apt to have a greater impact than if only naval or air forces are used.
A number of interesting patterns become evident in Figure 8.3. First, quite consistent with the findings in above sections, one notices that the
166
mean human rights abuse scores for countries having experienced US military actions are substantially higher than those that have not throughout the seven-year period. This underscores our argument regarding the selection process that occurs as a result of the US using force in certain kinds of
cases.
More interesting findings are evident in the trends once military action takes place. The downward trend in human rights abuse scores, from just above 3.6 to between 3.2 and 3.4 indicate moderate improvements in human dignity in the six years subsequent to US military actions. Further, we see that human rights abuse scores are somewhat lower in cases where ground forces are introduced, consistent with the reasoning presented above. Though the differences are rather small, this bivariate analysis
when viewed alone may be interpreted as evidence to support the claim that US uses of force have been successful in improving human rights.
There is good reason to be skeptical of such a claim, however. Previous research has shown that countries that have human rights scores in that range have a tendency to decrease over time, as such repression is difficult to maintain for long periods of time (Tate et al. 2000), so one might expect
that a decrease in human rights abuse scores would have occurred even if no military action had taken place.
To test for this possibility, we created a “control group” consisting of a subset of countries with a similar mean human rights score at time t, which did not experience US uses of force. To make sure that the composition of the two sets of countries was as similar as possible, we took a random
sample of the countries not experiencing military action, stratified according to the level of the dependent variable (Figure 8.4). Specifically, we
chose four times, the number of cases, for each of the five points on the human rights scale, as were present in the group of countries that experienced uses of force. This resulted in two groups of countries in which levels of human rights abuse were identical (3.64) at time t. In one group US military action had occurred, and in another they had not. The results show that human rights abuses decrease substantially more quickly when the USA chooses not to use force. At time t+6 the sample of cases in which the USA had not used force had a mean human rights score of 2.67, as compared to the mean of 3.35 in countries which had experienced military action at the same point of time, a difference that was highly statistically significant (p<0.001).
From these bivariate results we have learned that human rights conditions tend to improve in the wake of US military action. That said, this is most likely due to the countries that have most often been the target of these uses of force having relatively serious human rights problems prior to the intervention. In a subset of countries with similar histories of human rights abuse, which did not experience US military action, human rights conditions improvement occurred more quickly.
If we were to judge the effects of US uses of force on human rights solely on the basis of these simple pictures, the tendency would be to conclude that such actions worsened human rights conditions from what they would otherwise be by slowing their improvement. The possibility of misleading
effects as a result of selection bias come into play here too, however, since the subset of countries experiencing uses of force have already been shown to be substantially different from those which did on a variety of different characteristics.
A better idea of the actual effects of US uses of force can be gained by including other potential determinants of human rights in a multivariate model of human rights abuse, along with US uses of force. We will do so, in the next section.
Testing the effects of US military action in a multivariate model
To yield results in which we can have more confidence, we employ a more sophisticated statistical model.5 We also employ a set of control variables derived from prior research on human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999) including: (1) level of democracy; (2) per capita GNP; (3) logged
population; (4) leftist government dummy variable; (5) military dictatorship dummy variable; (6) British colonial influence; (7) involvement in international war; (
involvement in civil war; (9) organized nonviolent rebellion; and (10) organized violent rebellion. The results are available upon request. Here we simply describe the relationships we find between the use of force and human rights. We use three different measures of the US use of force. The first is measured simply as the occurrence of any US use of military force. The second is measured as a major level US use of force.6 The third is measured as a use of military force involving the
168
deployment of US ground forces.7 We employ the latter two variables to determine if a stronger commitment of the US military is needed to affect human rights. Major military actions are those that involve multiple units of air, land and/or sea forces that would be expected to provide a more visible and assertive US military presence. We would also expect that in instances where presidents ordered the deployment of US ground forces that the US government would possess greater leverage over the policies of the target regime. Ground forces are in a much stronger position to
affect change in a target country when they are used to secure a peace, patrol, and protect lives and property. Therefore, we expect that the more force used and the deployment of ground forces would be more associated with an increase in the protection of human rights. Each of these three, binary variables was lagged one-year, two-years and three-years to determine the length of time needed for force to actually influence, if at all, respect for human rights.
The effects of the three measures of uses of force on human rights are largely negligible. In the first set of measures we examined the effects of
all uses of force irrespective of size or type. Regardless of how many years
we lag the occurrence of a use of force (to allow time for human rights
practices to change within a country), the coefficients for the use of force
variables never attain statistical significance. Interestingly, the coefficient
for the one-year, lagged variable is negative, while the coefficients at twoand
three-year lags are positive. The impact of uses of force would appear
to change over time. At first, the use of force may lead to an increase in
respect for human rights, but later and perhaps after US forces have
departed the scene, the target nation experiences increasing violations.
One could imagine several possible scenarios associated with a use of
force. If US forces have left the target nation, that regime may be returning
to its previous and poor human rights policies, which may have triggered
the use of force. Whatever positive influence US military forces may
have on human rights may depend entirely on their continuing presence.
Or, it may be that the introduction of US forces creates greater instability
and political problems in the target country that lead to increasing violations
of human rights over time. The use of force may provoke opposition
or violence that the regime forcefully represses; it may be perceived by the
government as a green light to engage in abusive human rights practices
(especially if the use of force was in support of the regime); or it may lead
to a general breakdown in respect for the rule of law.
Perhaps the effects of a use of force are contingent upon the size and
type of military deployment. The President may need to order a substantial
deployment of US military personnel to cause a target regime to
modify its behavior. A flyover by the US Air Force, or a port visit by the
US Navy may not signal the depth of commitment required to effect a fundamental
change of human rights policies in the target regime. Therefore,
we next examined the effects of major uses of military force on human
169
rights. The findings are very similar to what we just found. First, none of
the lagged measures of major uses of military force are statistically significant,
although the coefficient for the one-year lag comes very close. We also
see that the effect of a major use of force one year after its occurrence is
negative – such deployments improve human rights. However, the coefficients
for the two-year and three-year lags are positive. Over time, major
uses of force tend to lead to decreasing protection of human rights.
We are also interested in evaluating the effects of uses of force involving
ground troops. Again, we see that the coefficients for these variables at
one-year, two-year and three-year lags are all statistically insignificant.
However, the signs of the coefficients change twice in these estimates. One
year after the deployment of ground forces, the effect is small, but positive,
which indicates a decrease in protection of human rights. At two
years, the coefficient for the lagged variable is negative, but at three years
it becomes positive once again. While we do not wish to make too much of
these findings due to the statistical insignificance of the coefficients, it may
be that all such deployments are entirely dependent upon a host of other
factors we do not measure, such as the purpose of the mission, the relationship
between the United States and the target regime, and subsequent
events.
One final possibility that occurs to us is that the duration of a dispute
may exercise an impact on human rights and repression. Carothers (2000:
107) observed that intervening nations usually focus on the endpoint, i.e.,
an election, and not on the process of establishing necessary preconditions
to substantive democracy, such as securing freedom of speech or protest
thus, in effect, focusing on the symptoms instead of the causes of the
problem. Short-term interventions, when the intervening party leaves as
soon as order is restored or an election held, may not be effective in
improving human rights for these reasons. In contrast, in long-term, or socalled
“state building” enterprises there are efforts to rebuild a nation
from the ground up, establishing new laws, and trying to cultivate new
laws and norms in the target country. It could be that longer-term uses of
force are more effective, resulting in greater respect of human rights in the
target country, than in shorter-term uses of force. Alternatively, if US
occupation is bad for human rights, then longer military actions might be
found to be worse for human rights than shorter ones.
In order to test for these possibilities we created a new data set in which
the unit of analysis is an event in which the USA used force. We then calculated
a variable that measured the duration of each US military action,
for which data were available, in days.8 In order to observe the effect of
duration of uses of force on human rights within those countries that
experienced such actions, we re-ran again the base model, this time including
the duration of the use of force, lagged one, two, and three, years
respectively.
Once again, the findings offer us no firm evidence that the duration of
170
US military actions make a difference for better or for worse. The coefficient
of the duration variable at lag one is closest to achieving statistical
significance (p<.07, two-tailed) indicating there is a good possibility that
duration has an effect. However, the positive sign indicates that the effect
of a longer duration (if there is one) is probably to increase human rights
abuses. Duration of the military action at the second lag has a negative
coefficient, while at the third lag the coefficient becomes positive again.
But these two variables do not approach conventional levels of statistical
significance.
Conclusion
In this study we have examined two closely interrelated, but nevertheless
distinct questions, “Why does the United States use force?” and, “What
are the ramifications for these uses of force for human rights practices
within the target countries?” Though they are distinct questions, to
address one without the other can produce only an incomplete story of the
relationship between human rights and the use of force.
Our findings are consistent with the claim that US military actions are
motivated by the desire to promote human rights, as human rights appear
to be one of the strongest predictors, if not the strongest predictor of US
uses of force. But, unfortunately, from a normative perspective, the results
also indicate that though the use of force by the US is partly motivated by
the desire to improve human rights in target countries, these actions do
not improve the substance of democracy in target nations; the degree to
which citizens are free to speak, worship, or simply to live peacefully, free
of the fear of imprisonment or acts of violence, by their governments.
We conducted a variety of analyses of the effects of uses of force on
human rights. We examined the effects of all US uses of force. We then
looked at a subset of the most serious uses of force, and then on those in
which ground forces were used. Finally, we used a variable that discriminated
between longer and shorter uses of force in countries that were the
targets of military action. And in each of these analyses we examined the
effects of uses of force at three separate lags. The results indicate rather
unambiguously that such military actions do not have any desirable impact
on human rights. Indeed, the findings suggested that if uses of force had
any impact, it was toward greater human rights abuse in interventions of
longer duration.
Rather than just assuming that we have explained as much as is possible,
we believe that there are other relationships and angles to be explored. We
caution against taking these results as verification of the extreme view of
Luttwak (1999) and others, who would say that humanitarian interventions
of almost any kind tend to make matters worse, by prolonging the
inevitable. Regarding US military actions, we know that during the Cold
War period, which constitutes most of this sample of data, though they
171
might have been a consideration, human rights considerations were not
always a top priority of US foreign policymakers. Indeed, such concerns
were often sacrificed in the interest of larger, strategic objectives. Since the
end of the Cold War, however, these interests have become much more
important, and many uses of force have been undertaken primarily to confront
human rights problems. Such cases need to be analyzed in more depth
and with data for more recent years to provide us with a better picture of
how much improvement in human rights we have seen (if any) as a consequence
of military interventions since the end of the Cold War. Further,
this study does not examine the effects of a wide variety of interventions
undertaken by other countries, and by international governmental, and
non-governmental organizations. Further research should look at the effectiveness
of the variety of instruments used by the world community, in its
attempt to foster improvements in the respect for human rights.
If we can draw one lesson from these analyses, it is that promoting
human rights is difficult at best and fraught with complexities. While the
results do not necessarily speak to what these complexities are, we may
hazard a few guesses. First, there are practical difficulties. Military interventions
often result in instability and sometimes greater violence, especially
in their early stages, as institutions traditionally responsible for law
and order may be pushed aside, damaged or even done away with. This in
turn may well create a more permissive environment in which human
rights abuses may flourish. Second, there are cultural complexities
involved in advancing a human rights agenda on a society that may be at a
minimum unprepared, and at worst, hostile to the imposition of a new set
of moral and political values. The presence of the US military may inspire
even greater opposition to the transference of such values than had they
been promoted via other avenues, such as foreign aid, diplomacy, and the
media. Third, there are strategic considerations that may militate against
human rights improvements as US foreign policymakers may be more concerned
with establishing a stable, friendly government rather than one that
is protective of human rights, but unable to maintain law and order. Yet,
despite the complexities inherent in the promotion of human rights, there
may as yet be long-term improvements in many of the targeted nation.
With the passage of time that will bring us more information on the effects
of the post-Cold War interventions, we can begin to better understand the
extent to which these uses of force have improved human rights, or
whether the targeted nations would have been better off without such
intervention.
Notes
1 This portion of “The Annual Defense Report” is found at http://www.dtic.mil/
execsec/adr2000/chap1.html
2 The measurement of democracy is taken from the Polity IV dataset, courtsey of
the Polity IV project at the University of Maryland. Data is from the Polity IV
172
website at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. It is measured on
the 0–10 scale where “10” is the most democratic.
3 Human rights data are taken from the International Human Rights Study
Center website at http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/ courtesy of Steve Poe and Neal
Tate. The human rights measure is a 1–5 scale with greater values indicating
more repression of human rights to personal integrity.
4 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html
5 We use a pooled time series model with panel-corrected standard errors and a
lagged, endogenous variable to counter the effects of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.
6 Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 50) divide force levels into three broad groups: (1)
Major force level including at least one of the following: (a) two or more aircraft
carrier task groups; (b) more than one battalion ground unit; (c) one or more air
combat wings; (2) Standard force level including at least one of the following: (a)
one aircraft carrier task group; (b) a ground unit of no more than one battalion,
but larger than one company; (c) one or more air combat squadrons, but less
than one wing; (3) Minor force level including at least one of the following: (a)
naval units without aircraft carriers; (b) ground units of no more than one
company; (c) less than one air combat squadron.
7 Any US military intervention in which Blechman and Kaplan and the other
sources used to obtain data on the use of force list the deployment of units of the
US Army or US Marines are coded as a US use of force involving ground forces.
8 There were 110 instances of the use of force during the period under study. We
were able to obtain lengths for 87 cases, which ranged from one day to 2,734
days. We coded cases that were still ongoing at the end of 1996 as missing. Also
in some instances there was insufficient information to calculate the duration of
an event, and those were coded as missing. We also lost some of the cases as a
result of lagging this variable three years, leaving us with an N of 62. It should be
noted that for ease of statistical manipulation, only one intervention was
counted per country per year.
References
Apodaca, C. and Stohl, M. (1999) “United States Human Rights Policy and
Foreign Assistance,” International Studies Quarterly 43: 185–198.
Benoit, K. (1996) “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (In General): Reexamining
Regime Type and War Involvement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40
(December): 636–657.
Blanton, S.L. (1994) “Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Foreign Assistance to
Latin America,” International Interactions 19(4): 339–358.
Blanton, S.L. (2000) “Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the Developing
World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S. Arms Exports,” American Journal of Political
Science 44(1): 123–131.
Blechman, B. and Kaplan, S. (1978) Force Without War. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1992) War and Reason. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Carothers, T. (2000) Aiding Democracy Abroad. Washington, DC: The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Center for Naval Analyses (1991) “The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era:
U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990,”
Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
173
Cingranelli, D.L. and Pasquarello, T. (1985). “Human Rights Practices and the
U.S. Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries,” American
Journal of Political Science 29: 539–63.
Fossedal, G.A. (1989) The Democratic Imperative. New York: Basic Books Inc.
Hermann, M. and Kegley, C. (1998) “The Use of U.S. Military Intervention to
Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record,” International Interactions 24:
91–114.
Huth, P.K. (1998) “Major Power Intervention in International Crises,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 42(December): 744–770.
Ikenberry, G.J. and Kupchan, C.A. (1990) “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,”
International Organization 44: 283–315.
Job, B.L. and Ostrom C.W. Jr. (1986) “Opportunity and Choice: The U.S. and the
Political Use of Force: 1948–1976,” paper presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
Krasner, S. (1978) Defending the National Interest. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Leeds, B.A. and Davis, D. (1999) “Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International
Interaction, 1953–78,” Journal of Peace Research 36: 5–21.
Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1980) Applied Regression: An Introduction. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications.
Luttwak, E. (1999) “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78(4): 36–44.
Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. (1993) “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review 87: 624–638.
McCormick, J.M. and Mitchell, N. (1988) “Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to
Human Rights in Latin America,” American Journal of Political Science 32:
231–239.
McDougall, W.A. (1997) Promised Land, Crusader State. Boston, MA: Houston
Mifflin Company.
Meernik, J. (1996) “U.S. Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,”
Journal of Peace Research 33: 391–402.
Morgenthau, H.J. (1973) Politics Among Nations. 5th edn. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf.
Owen, J.M. IV (1994) “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International
Security 19: 87–125.
Owen, J.M. IV (2002) “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International
Organization 56(Spring): 375–409.
Peceny, M. (1995) “Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy During U.S. Military
Interventions,” International Studies Quarterly 39: 371–401.
Peceny, M. (1999) Democracy at the point of Bayonets. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press.
Poe, S.C. and Sirirangsi, R. (1994) “Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During
the Reagan Years,” Social Science Quarterly 75: 494–509.
Poe, S.C. and Tate, C.N. (1994) “Repression of Human Rights to Personal
Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis,” American Political Science Review
88: 853–872.
Poe, S.C., Tate, C.N., and Keith, L.C. (1999) “Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study Covering the Years
1976–1993,” International Studies Quarterly 43: 291–315.
Prins, B.C. and Sprecher, C. (1999) “Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition
and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems,
1946–89,” Journal of Peace Research 36: 271–287.
Regan, P.M. (1995) “U.S. Economic Aid and Political Repression: An Empirical
Evaluation of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Research Quarterly 48: 613–628.
Smith, T. (1994) America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle
for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Stohl, M. and Carleton, D. (1985) “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric
and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan,” Human Rights Quarterly 7:
205–229.
Stohl, M., Carleton, D., and Johnson, S. (1984) “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign
Assistance from Nixon to Carter,” Journal of Peace Research 21: 215–226.
Tate, C.N., Poe, S.C., Keith, L.C., and Lanier, D.N. (2000) “Domestic Threats: The
Abuse of Personal Integrity,” in C. Davenport (ed.) Paths to State Repression:
Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Whitcomb, R. (1998) The American Approach to Foreign Affairs. Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers.
Zelikow, P.D. (1987) “The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical
Summary,” in George K. Osborn, A. Clark IV, D.J. Kaufman, and D.E. Cote
(eds.) Democracy, Strategy and Vietnam. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
من طرف salim 1979 الثلاثاء يناير 16, 2024 8:08 pm
-----------------------------