منتدى قالمة للعلوم السياسية
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم .. أخي الزائر الكريم ..أهلآ وسهلآ بك في منتداك ( منتدى قالمة للعلوم سياسية ) إحدى المنتديات المتواضعة في عالم المنتديات والتي تزهو بالعلم الشرعي والمعرفة والفكر والثقافة .. نتمنى لكم قضاء أسعد الأوقات وأطيبها .. نتشرف بتسجيلك فيه لتصبح أحد أعضاءه الأعزاء وننتظر إسهاماتكم ومشاركاتكم النافعة وحضوركم وتفاعلكم المثمر .. كما نتمنى أن تتسع صفحات منتدانا لحروف قلمكم ووميض عطائكم .. وفقكم الله لما يحبه ويرضاه , وجنبكم ما يبغضه ويأباه. مع فائق وأجل تقديري وإعتزازي وإحترامي سلفآ .. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته . المشرف العام
منتدى قالمة للعلوم السياسية
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم .. أخي الزائر الكريم ..أهلآ وسهلآ بك في منتداك ( منتدى قالمة للعلوم سياسية ) إحدى المنتديات المتواضعة في عالم المنتديات والتي تزهو بالعلم الشرعي والمعرفة والفكر والثقافة .. نتمنى لكم قضاء أسعد الأوقات وأطيبها .. نتشرف بتسجيلك فيه لتصبح أحد أعضاءه الأعزاء وننتظر إسهاماتكم ومشاركاتكم النافعة وحضوركم وتفاعلكم المثمر .. كما نتمنى أن تتسع صفحات منتدانا لحروف قلمكم ووميض عطائكم .. وفقكم الله لما يحبه ويرضاه , وجنبكم ما يبغضه ويأباه. مع فائق وأجل تقديري وإعتزازي وإحترامي سلفآ .. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته . المشرف العام
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 A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy

اذهب الى الأسفل 
كاتب الموضوعرسالة
salim 1979
التميز الذهبي
التميز الذهبي



تاريخ الميلاد : 27/05/1979
العمر : 45
الدولة : الجزائر
عدد المساهمات : 5285
نقاط : 100012179
تاريخ التسجيل : 06/11/2012

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Empty
مُساهمةموضوع: A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy   A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Emptyالثلاثاء نوفمبر 13, 2012 10:58 pm


A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy
Jerel A. Rosati, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Editors' Introduction
In this chapter Jerel Rosati introduces the role of cognitive studies in foreign policy analysis. As Rosati illustrates, cognitive analyses consider the role of policymakers' beliefs and images and are pre-sent in both the first and second generations of foreign policy analysts. Indeed. much of what this chapter discusses can be found in literature focusing on the "individual" level of foreign policy analysis. Rosati makes explicit the changes occurring in cognitive studies throughout the evolution of foreign policy analysis and emphasizes the contributions of recent , second-generation. cognitive studies. This chapter complements the following chapter by Keith Shimko, which looks specifically at the metaphors (a cognitive concept) leaders use in developing foreign policy.
In considering the role of cognitive sources of foreign policy, can you think of any modem examples of foreign policy makers whose beliefs and images influenced foreign policy? For example, would Président Clinton's belief System have led him to a different policy in the Gulf War than the one pursued by President Bush? What type of belief system might have been behind Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait? Consider your own belief system. How would il influence your foreign policy actions if you were a policymaker? How important are cognitive factors as compared to other sources of foreign policy (e.g., bureaucratic. domestic political systemic)? ■
How do policymakers view the world? What affects the beliefs and images of policy-makers over time? What impact do the beliefs of policymakers have on foreign policy making and the practice of foreign policy? These are the kinds of questions about the role of cognition that interest many students of foreign policy and are addressed in their scholarship, hence contributing to knowledge and understanding about the for¬mulation and conduct of foreign policy. Although the value of a cognitive approach should be obvious, it has not always received the attention it deserves in the study of foreign policy.1

50 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
Traditionally, foreign policy has been explained from a rational actor perspec¬tive common to the realist and power politics tradition. The assumption has been that governments, and their political leaders, think and act in a rational manner in their quest for power and order. Such rationality assumes that individuals perceive the world accurately and arrive at decisions through an open intellectual process: goals are ordered, a search is made for relevant information, a wide range of alterna¬tives is considered, and the option that maximizes the benefits while minimizing the costs is selected. Since policymakers act rationally in pursuit of power and order, there is no need to delve into their psychological predispositions or closely examine the governmental policymaking process. Instead, one should focus on how the inter¬national System constrains foreign policy action, treat the government as a rational actor, and speak in terms of an overriding shared national interest in the making of foreign policy.
A cognitive approach challenges much of Western thought and practice premised on the assumption of individual rationality (see Allison 1971, 10-38; Simon 1957b; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Steinbruner 1974, 25-46). Where the rational actor perspective assumes individual open-mindedness and adaptability to changes in the environment, a cognitive approach posits that individuals tend to be much more closed-minded due to their beliefs and the way they process informa¬tion—thus, they tend to resist adapting to changes in the environment. A cognitive perspective emphasizes the importance of examining the individuals involved in the policymaking process, for they are likely to view their environment differently. This approach has grown in visibility, prominence, and sophistication since the 1950s as social scientists have attempted to be more systematic in identifying and explaining major patterns of foreign policy.
This chapter is organized along three lines so the reader can arrive at a better understanding of the development of a cognitive approach and its relevance for contributing to an understanding of the theory and practice of foreign policy. First, a brief history of the evolution of political psychology and its impact on a cognitive approach to the study of foreign policy is provided. Second, a number of significant research programs and individual studies are highlighted to illustrate different cognitive approaches to the study of foreign policy. Finally, an assessment is made of what has been learned by a cognitive approach to foreign policy over the past few decades and what issues require future attention. Together, this should provide the basis for clarifying how a cognitive approach can contribute to a better understanding ot the dynamics of foreign policy.
■ The Political Psychological Study of Beliefs and Foreign Policy
Scholars and individuals have been interested in examining the beliefs of individuals and the workings of the human mind throughout the ages. Yet it was not until the 1930s, with the development of psychology as a discipline of study, that systematic efforts to apply psychological approaches to the study of politics and international relations really began. The evolution of political psychology and its relevance to inter¬national relations and foreign policy is marked by three distinct periods. With each new period the political psychological study of beliefs has grown tremendously in

A Cognitive Approach to the Study Of Foreign Policy 51
sophistication and has contributed to a powerful understanding of the theory and practice of foreign policy.2
Early Efforts
Early efforts were made beginning in the 1930s and continuing through the early 1950s to apply explicitly psychological concepts to the study of politics, especially the nature of war and peace. Most of this research focused on national stereotypes, atti¬tudes toward war, and public opinion on foreign policy issues (Kelman 1965b; Klineberg 1950; Pear 1950). Unfortunately, while most of these early efforts were made by scholars and individuals who were well versed in psychology, they usually lacked a strong foundation in the study of international relations and world politics. This was best exemplified by the studies on individual irregularities and pathologies that were directly projected onto the nation-state, the "war begins in the minds of men" approach, and national character studies of the war proneness of different societies.
This well-intentioned effort by many psychologists to apply different psycho¬logical concepts and knowledge about the individual "directly" to the complex arena of the state and world politics was not well received by students of international rela¬tions (see Holsti 1976, 16-20; Jervis 1976, 3-10). Most international relations scholars found these studies unrealistic and believed they were not relevant to the study of foreign policy and world politics (see, e.g., Waltz 1959). The problem was clearly stated by Herbert Kelman in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis: "Only if we know where and how these individuals fit into the larger process, and under what circumstances they operate, are we able to offer a relevant psychological analysis" (1965b, 6). Clearly, until political psychology was well grounded in politics and international relations such studies would likely remain naive and simplistic.
Although the initial effort to incorporate psychological approaches into the analysis of international behavior failed to influence the field, some scholars began to question the lack of psychological input into the study of international relations and foreign policy. Quincy Wright, in his magnum opus, The Study of International Relations, proposed that psychology belongs at the "core" of the discipline: "International relations cannot, therefore, be confined to intergovernmental relations and conclusions based on the assumption that they [i.e., psychological studies] tail to provide an adequate foundation for prediction and control. The minds of individuals who constitute the world's population, the influences that affect them, and the influ¬ences they exert, both domestic and foreign, must be taken into account by examining their minds" ( 1955, 433).
The First Generation of Scholarship
Beginning in the mid- 1950s, the contribution of psychological approaches to the study of international relations grew in importance due to the interaction of the "peace research" movement and the "behavioral" revolution in the social sciences (see Kelman 1965b; Kelman and Bloom 1973). A number of psychologists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and other scientists became interested in applying

52 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
the knowledge and techniques of their disciplines to the problems of war and peace. At the same time, many international relations scholars became interested in making their field more empirical and scientific. Nowhere was this interaction greater than among those who advocated a decision-making approach to the study of foreign pol¬icy (see Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962).
In comparison to the early efforts by psychologists, the late 1950s and 1960s represented the beginning of a qualitative leap forward for psychological approaches and their application to the study of international relations. Psychological approaches increasingly were applied from an international relations and political perspective. Two groups of specialists "emerged and interacted closely with one another: students of international relations, with a political science background, who are thoroughly grounded in social-psychological concepts and methods; and social psychologists (as well as students of other disciplines outside of political science) who have systematically educated themselves in the field of international relations" (Kelman and Bloom 1973, 263).
These developments meant that the systematic study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy makers grew in popularity and significance during the 1960s and 1970s. The working assumption was that the ideas and thoughts about the environment held by policymakers affect the foreign policy-making process. Policymaker images "mav be partial or general. They may be subconscious or may be consciously stated. They may be based on carefully thought-out assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgements. In any event ail decision-makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be conditioned by them in their behavior on for¬eign policy" (Brecher, Steinbcrg, and Stein 1969, 86-87).
Much of the psychologically oriented research on foreign policy was influenced by the study of attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology that began as early as the 1930s (see Calder and Ross 1973; Oskamp 1977). Most of the work on attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology during this time was based upon theories of cognitive consistency, including cognitive dissonance, congruity, and balance theory (see Abelson et al. 1968; Festinger 1957; McGuire 1969; Oskamp 1977). The assump¬tion behind cognitive consistency is that individuals make sense of the world by relying on key beliefs and strive to maintain consistency between their beliefs. Under cognitive consistency, individuals maintain coherent belief Systems and attempt to avoid acquiring information that is inconsistent or incompatible with their beliefs, especially their most central beliefs. In other words, "individuals do not merely sub-scribe to random collections of beliefs but rather they maintain coherent Systems of beliefs which arc internally consistent" (Bem 1970, 13).
The study of the impact of propaganda and communications on individuals reinforced research on cognitive consistency (McGuire 1969; Oskamp 1977; Sears and Whitney 1973). The literature on persuasive communications at the time indicated that most individuals are indifferent to persuasive appeals, especially political propaganda, and when they are attuned they tend to be surrounded by people and communications with which they sympathize. In other words, incoming information typically gets interpreted in accordance with an individual's existing central beliefs and predispositions.

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 53
The prevalence of cognitive consistency, and the tendency of most communications to reinforce an individual's belief System, found in the first generation of political psychological research provided the foundation for many studies of foreign policy decision making since the 1960s. This psychological literature and its relevance for the study of foreign policy were brought together by Robert Jervis ( 1976) in Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* jervis provided a significant service to the advancement of a cognitive approach to foreign policy through his rich survey of the processes of perception for foreign policymakers, including a discussion of how cognitive consistency affects decision makers, how decision makers learn from history, how attitudes change, and an analysis of common patterns of misper¬ception among policymakers. Not only did he illustrate the relevance of a cognitive approach for foreign policy and international relations, he also used such a perspec¬tive to critique what he saw as simplistic assumptions of both deterrence theory and the spiral model of state interaction in world politics. As Jervis concluded, "lt is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others" ( 1976, 28).
Second-Generation Scholarship
Beginning in the 1970s, psychology underwent what has been referred to as a "cogni-tive revolution" in the study of attitudes and how individuals process information. The revolution involved a different conception of the individual and his or her inter¬action with the environment: away from a "passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli" to a concept of the individual as more likely to selectively respond to and actively shape his or her environment; away from an individual who "strives for consistency" toward an individual who is more likely to act as a "problem solver" in order to make sense of a complex environment involving great uncertainty (George 1980b, 56; see also Fiske and Taylor 1991, 9-14; Lau and Sears 1986c). Responding to developments in cognitive theory, psychological research increasingly moved beyond the study of cognitive consistency to a more sophisticated study of attitudes and information processing often referred to as social cognition theory and schema theory.4
Social cognition theory and schema theory assume that individuals are "cognitive misers" who tend to rely on existing beliefs and schema- that is, mental constructs that represent different clumps of knowledge about various facets of the environ¬ment—for interpreting information. Although schema necessarily simplify and structure the external environment, they are the basis from which individuals are able to organize new information, use their memory, and ineligibly make sense of the world around them. The more complex and uncertain the environment, the more likely individuals will rely on simple schema and cognitive heuristics—shortcuts in information processing to make sense of the world and the situation at hand (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Lau and Sears 1986b; Milburn 1991 ).5
The social cognition theory and schema theory approach to attitudes and beliefs builds upon and extends the previous work on cognitive consistency but is based on a more complex and sophisticated understanding of the nature of atti-tudes and how information is processed by the mind. Social cognition theory and schema theory emphasize the dominant role of preexisting beliefs in interpreting

54 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
new information, much like cognitive consistency theory. Yet, where the theory of cognitive consistency assumes the existence of a belief system with a high degree of coherence and interdependence between beliefs that are extremely resistant to change, a social cognition perspective depicts individual belief systems as much more fragmented internally, with different beliefs or schema being invoked under different situations for making sense of the environment. This suggests a greater likelihood that some beliefs may change over time. From this perspective, although the beliefs held by an individual may appear incompatible and contradictory to an outside observer, the overall belief System is likely to make sense to the individual of concern, suggesting a rather complex cognitive process. Although more sophisticated than cognitive consistency theory about the workings of the human mind, cognitive psychology and social cognition nevertheless continue to represent an alternative to the rational actor perspective.
Two major works published near the beginning of the so-called cognitive revolution anticipated many of these developments in the area of social cognition theory and schema theory, integrating them into the study of foreign policy. One, already discussed, was Perception and Misperception in International Politics by Robert Jervis ( 1976i. The other was another landmark in cognitive approaches to the study of foreign policy, entitled The Cybernetic Theory of Decision by john Steinbruner (1974). Actually, Steinbruner's title was somewhat of a misnomer; his book really developed a "cognitive theory of decision" that made three significant contributions. First, Steinbruner demonstrated that the rational actor model (what he called the analytic paradigm) has great difficulty in explaining governmental decision making and per-formance, especially under real-world conditions of complexity and uncertainty. Second, he synthesized a large body of knowledge from the fields of cybernetics and cognitive theory in developing a cognitive process model as an alternative to the rational actor model. He argued that relatively simple decisions could be explained b\' a simple cybernetic process of "satisficing" and "incrementalism" commonly found in bureaucracy. However, to explain more complex decisions one had to turn to a cognitive process model (or cognitive paradigm; in order to understand the regularities of how the mind deals with uncertainty. According to this model, the mind "constantly struggles to impose clear, coherent meaning on events" (Steinbruner 1974, 112), relying on "cognitive structures" involving memory, centrality, consistency, simplicity, and stability. Finally, Steinbruner not only demonstrated how individuals arrive at decisions under the cognitive process model but discussed how the model applies within a larger collective decision-making context as occurs within the government: "In essence, it is cognitive operations of the human mind working in interaction with the organizational structure of the government which set work-able limits on highly diffuse decision problems" (Steinbruner 1974, 14). Ultimately, what Steinbruner did was present a coherent and powerful theoretical foundation for the cognitive study of foreign policy.
■ Major Foreign Policy Studies
The evolution of the psychological study of attitudes provided the foundation for a number of research programs and studies employing a cognitive approach to the

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 55
study of foreign policy, especially since the first generation of scholarship. The most significant approaches and studies over time will be highlighted here; these both reflect the evolution of the cognitive study of foreign policy and have contributed to its development.6 These works vary in terms of conceptual orientation, substantive focus, and research strategy, as discussed subsequently.
Images of the Enemy and Mirror Images
The earliest and most popular studies employing a cognitive approach in a system-atic fashion have focused on general images held by political elites, especially images of the "other" and self-images. Such a cognitive approach to foreign policy has been a particularly powerful source for better understanding international conflict and war.
One of the most powerful studies from the first generation of scholarship has been Ole Holsti's (1962, 1967; Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen 1967, 25-96) work on the imagf of the enemy.' Holsti believed that the concept of the enemy helped to explain and sustain international conflict over time. In order to better understand U.S.-Soviet hostility and the evolution of the cold war, he employed a case study to examine the image of the Soviet Union held by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Holsti (1967, 17) assumed that hostile images of the enemy, represented by Dulles's image of the Soviet Union, tended to be self-perpetuating, which could be explained by the psychological literature on cognitive dynamics.
Dulles's image of the Soviet Union was derived from a content analysis of his public statements "supplemented by contemporary newspapers, secondary sources, questionnaires sent to a number of Dulles's closest associates, and memoirs written by those who worked closely with him" (Holsti 1967, 18). Holsti found that Dulles's extremely hostile image of the Soviet Union was very rigid and resistant to change regardless of changes in Soviet behavior. This was consistent with the psychological literature on cognitive dynamics based on the nature of attitudes, cognitive consis-tency, and persuasive communications.8 Dulles resisted new information inconsistent with his image of the Soviet Union by engaging in a variety of psychological processes: discrediting the information, searehing for other consistent information, reinterpret-ing the information, differentiating between different aspects of the information, engaging in wishful thinking, and refusing to think about it. According to Holsti, the self-perpetuation and resistance to change found in Dulles's image of the Soviet Union was based on an "inherent bad faith" model of the enemy: "As long as the Soviet Union remained a closed society ruled by Communists, it represented the antithesis of values at the core of Dulles' belief System. Furthermore, information that might challenge the inherent-bad-faith model of the Soviet Union generally came from the Soviets themselves a low-credibility source and was often ambiguous enough to accommodate more than one interpretation" ( 1967, 24).
The study of mirror images is consistent with the study of the image of the enemy but involves the images held by both parties in a hostile relationship. The con¬cept of mirror images refers to the fact that each party holds an image that is diametrically "opposite" the other: each party has a positive and benevolent self-image while holding a negative and malevolent image of the enemy. Ralph White (1966, 1968) popularized the notion of mirror images in Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars.9 Analyzing the two World Wars and focusing on the

56 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
Vietnam War, White discussed how each party in a conflict situation holds a "diaboli-cal enemy-image" and a "virile and moral self-image" that become the source of selective inattention, absence of empathy (for the other), and military overconfidence. Although the resuit of diverse social and psychological sources, such "black-and-white" thinking leads to escalation and war. As White concluded, "The ethnocentric black-and-white picture is a transcultural, almost universal phenomenon, the details of which vary greatly from nation to nation, but the essence of which remains much the same. ... In view of this it is not surprising that there is a 'mirror image' quality in the reality-worlds of combatants" (1968, 275).
The Operational Code
One of the most popular approaches for describing a political leader’s belief system has been the development of what has been called the operational code, based upon Nathan Leites's (1951, 1953) study of communism in the Soviet Union. However, it was not until Alexander George (1969) refined the concept that the operational code became popular as a research program in the area of foreign policy involving numerous scholars. The operational code is based on the concept of cognitive consistency, for it assumes an overall coherent and interconnected set of beliefs about the nature of political life.1"
The operational code approach consists of two fundamental types of beliefs— philosophical and instrumental beliefs organized around ten questions. Philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises regarding the fundamental nature of politics, political conflict and one's opponents, the future, and historical development. Instrumental beliefs refer to beliefs about strategy and tactics concerning political action, risk taking, timing, and means for advancing one's interests. The operational code serves as a guide to political decision making: the individual's philosophical beliefs help diagnose the definition of the situation, while the instrumental beliefs affect the likely choice of action (see George 1979b).
One of the more interesting uses of the operational code has been Stephen Walker's ( 1977) study of former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.11 Walker examined the interface between Henry Kissinger's opera-tional code and his bargaining behavior during the Vietnam conflict. The study was particularly informative in depicting how Kissinger saw the world, including the role of great powers, and his understanding of the use of force and negotiations in inter-acting with an adversary. Walker also found a close relationship between Kissinger's operational code (through his academic writings) and his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations (through governmental and secondary sources). While the operational code has been a powerful cognitive approach for determining the "content" of politi¬cal leaders' foreign policy beliefs, Walker's study represents an early landmark in actually examining the relationship between foreign policy beliefs and behavior.
Cognitive Mapping
In the early 1970s an attempt was made to examine the beliefs of policymakers in a more specific and rigorous way through the use of a cognitive map. A cognitive map refers to a specific set of beliefs, and their interconnectedness, as they exist in the







الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل
salim 1979
التميز الذهبي
التميز الذهبي



تاريخ الميلاد : 27/05/1979
العمر : 45
الدولة : الجزائر
عدد المساهمات : 5285
نقاط : 100012179
تاريخ التسجيل : 06/11/2012

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Empty
مُساهمةموضوع: رد: A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy   A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Emptyالثلاثاء نوفمبر 13, 2012 11:02 pm


A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 57
mind of a decision maker concerning some aspect of the environment. It is a "specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem" (Axelrod 1976, 55). The foundation of cognitive mapping is based upon the early formulations of Robert Axelrod (1972, 1973) and Michael Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham (1973), derived from the literature on cognitive consistency and schema theory.
From the work of Shapiro and Bonham (see, e.g„ Bonham 1976), a decision maker goes through five basic cognitive steps when he or she perceives a new interna¬tional situation that may require a policy response: initial amplification (of relevant beliefs), search for antecedents (explaining the events), search for consequences {of likely future behavior of actors involved), search for policy alternatives, and policy choice. Given the focus on specifie mental constructs and causal beliefs over different information-processing stages, the cognitive mapping approach allows for a mathematical modeling and computer simulation of the mind. Such an approach has been particularly useful for examining specific decisions and analyzing the cognitive complexity of decision makers in a variety of contexts, as demonstrated by the collection of studies in Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, edited by Robert Axelrod (1976b).12
Attribution Theory and International Conflict
Since the 1950s psychologists have been interested in understanding how people per-ceive the causes of human behavior, resulting in the generation of a body of knowledge known as attribution theory. It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s, how-ever, that attribution theory grew in prominence and began to influence the study of political psychology. Attribution theorists have attempted to identify the various types of attribution errors and biases that people commonly make. For example, the "fundamental attribution error" is the tendency to attribute (explain) our own behavior in terms of external or situational causes. This would be akin to someone saying, "The situation forced me to do what I did." However, this error also entails attributing the behavior of others to internal causes. In this case the same person might say, "The other person acted as he or she did because he or she is mean-spirited." This is further affected by the "self-serving bias," which is the tendency to take credit for good or pos-itive behaviors but to deny responsibility for bad or negative behaviors, and the "halo effect," which is the tendency to see friends in a positive light and enemies in a negative light (Baron and Byrne 1981; Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears 1970; Jones 1972; Nisbett and Ross 1980).
Attribution theory has not received as much attention from scholars who take a cognitive approach to the study of foreign policy as have other psychological con-cepts discussed previously. Nevertheless, an important study employing this perspective, along with consistency theory, was conducted by Daniel Heradstveit (1979) in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace.13 Based on inter¬views of political activists conducted in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, Heradstveit found strong support for the existence of the fundamental attribution error in explaining the behaviors of participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, he found that the inference of internal causes of the opponent's behavior is enhanced when the observer dislikes the actor who performs the blameworthy act, which is

58 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
consistent with the self-serving bias and the halo effect. As stated by Heradstveit, "If I have a devil-image of the opponent and the opponent behaves in an indisputably friendly way, I can still maintain my beliefs about the opponent by explaining his friendly behavior as caused by environmental influences and constraints. His disposi-tion to act in an unfriendly way remains the same, but certain characteristics of the situation have forced him to be temporarily friendly. In other words, the opponent is not given responsibility (credit) for what he is doing" ( 1979, 74). Such research based on attribution theory contributes to a further understanding of the rise and rigidity of the image of the enemy and mirror images during times of conflict.
More Recent Studies
Beginning in the 1980s a number of individuals built upon earlier work in an effort to further extend knowledge and understanding of the role of cognitive approaches to the study of foreign policy. Much of this work emphasized the need to synthesize available knowledge and to be more eclectic in the study of foreign policy, reflecting the growing diversity and interdisciplinary nature of the study of international rela¬tions. Four studies that reflect such concerns and have contributed to them are highlighted here.14
One important study has been Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, by Deborah Larson (1985), which employs cognitive social psychology to explain the origins of the cold war. Larson specifically attempted to explain the changes that transpired in the beliefs of key U.S. policymakers W. Averell Harriman, Harry S. Truman, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson toward the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1947 in terms of five rival theories of attitude change: the Hovland attitude change approach (involving persuasive communications), cognitive dissonance theory (the classic cognitive consistency approach), attribution theory, self-perception theory (which makes the unique argument that individual beliefs are derived from observing one's own behavior), and schema theory. Through an analy-sis of the archival evidence, Larson concluded that Harriman, Truman, and Byrnes, unlike Acheson, did not have coherent, structured belief Systems; instead, their inconsistent and contradictory beliefs resulted in each eventually developing an enemy image of the Soviet Union in his own way. In tact, since "U.S. policymakers used different types of cognitive processes to interpret information about Soviet behavior...No one theory of attitude change explains the origins of American leaders’ Cold War belief System" ( Larson 1985, 342). Instead, self-perception, schema, and attribution theories were all useful in explaining the individual policymakers' beliefs about the Soviet Union over time. Accordingly, the Larson study is particularly powerful in demonstrating the complexity and messiness of individual belief Systems and cognition, especially during times of considerable uncertainty.
Another important cognitive study is Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy, by Richard Herrmann (1985; see also 1984, 1988). Building on the work of Richard Cottam ( 1977), this study addressed "the problem of inferring the perceptions and motives of a nation's leaders" in order to better understand Soviet foreign policy (Herrmann 1985, xix). Drawing on attribution and cognitive consistency theory, Herrmann developed a framework that presents three common types of perceptions policymakers have of rival countries and their likely implications for




A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 59
foreign policy behavior. the "enemy" stereotype that produces a defensive foreign policy pattern; the "degenerate" stereotype that produces an expansionist foreign policy pattern; the "child" stereotype that produces an imperialist foreign policy pattern. Based on an examination of the stereotypical justifications invoked in Soviet speeches, public statements, and foreign policy behavior, Herrmann found that the Soviet image of the United States resembled the classic enemy stereotype in 1967, evolved into a more complex and less stereotypical enemy image in 1972, and then reverted to a more stereotypical enemy image in 1979, although more differen-tiated and less intense than in 1967. Herrmann's cognitive approach and empirical findings contribute to an understanding of the motives underlying foreign policy behavior in general and Soviet foreign policy in particular, especiaily in its implica¬tions for U.S. foreign policy.
Another significant cognitive study of foreign policy produced during the eighties is The Carter Administrations Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior, by Jerel Rosati (1987; see also 1984, 1990). Given the reports of policy disputes between high-level officials, especiaily Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Securitv Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and conflicting interpretations of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy views during the late seventies, Rosati saw the Carter administration as an excellent case study for applying some of the insights of social and cognitive psychology to advance an understanding of U.S. foreign pol-icy. Employing a content analysis of public statements made by Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski throughout their four years in office, Rosati found that in 1977 the Carter administration initially had an optimistic worldview that was shared by the principal policymakers, that individual differences emerged in 1978 when Brzezinski's image of the Soviet Union hardened. that the administration's image fragmented in 1979 as Carter began to waver between Vance's optimism and Brzezinski's increasing pes-simism, and that by the beginning of 1980 a new consensus emerged based on a pessimistic image of an increasingly unstable world in which Soviet power had to be contained. The stability of Vance's image and the change in Brzezinski's and Carter's images were explained through use of the literature on cognitive consistency, persua¬sive communications, individual personality, the impact of external events, and the role of domestic politics. Ultimately, Rosati found that the greater the consensus in beliefs among individual policymakers, the greater the likelihood that the Carter administration's foreign policy behavior was congruent with those beliefs. Mot only does the study shed light on the nature and significance of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter years, but it also demonstrates the power of a broad cognitive approach for contributing to an understanding of continuity and change in policymakers beliefs over time and their impact on foreign policy behavior.
Finaliy, there is the important study by Yuen Foong Khong( 1992 ) Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, which focuses on "how and why policymakers use historical analogies in their foreign policy decision-making" (Khong 1992, Cool. It specifically addresses the question of whether the use of "lessons of history" invoked by policymakers actually shapes policy or pri-marily serves as its justification. Relying on the public record, interviews, and archivai documents, Khong demonstrates that the lessons policymakers drew from Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and, most importantly, the Korean War had a powerful influence on












60 Second-Generation foreign Policy Analysis
the decision-making process relative to Vietnam because they predisposed them toward military intervention. In other words, policymakers use analogies not merely to justify policies but also to perform specific cognitive tasks essential to political decision making: to help define the nature of the situation facing the policymaker, to help assess the stakes, and to provide policy prescriptions. The Khong study con-tributes to an improved understanding of why humans analogies and why policymakers often use analogies poorly due to a common cognitive process.
■ What Do We Know? Where Should We Go?
In surveying the development of political psychology and cognitive approaches to foreign policy, it should be relatively clear that much knowledge has accumulated concerning the role of policymakers' beliefs and images on foreign policy. In this sec¬tion Ibriefly review what has been learned about the cognitive study of foreign policy and discuss some questions that remain unanswered or need to be addressed in the future,
Content of Beliefs
One feature ail cognitive approaches share is that they provide an excellent perspec¬tive for determining the actual contents of the beliefs and images held by individual policymakers. A myriad of cognitive approaches can be drawn upon. For instance, the operational code emphasizes a policymaker's broad beliefs about politics; the image of the "other" focuses on the policymaker's perceptions and beliefs concerning a particular actor in world politics; cognitive mapping tends to examine a policy-maker's foreign policy beliefs toward very specific issues. Whether a broad or narrow perspective is taken, a cognitive approach allows one to examine any aspect of a poli-cymaker's foreign policy beliefs to contribute to a better understanding of foreign policy. This is particularly important because historians and observers of contemporary politics often make judgments and disagree about the contents of policymakers' beliefs. In this respect, a cognitive perspective allows for a more sophisticated foundation to examine the contents of the beliefs of policymakers. In the study of U.S. foreign policy, for example, cognitive approaches have contributed to a better under¬standing of the origins of the cold war (Larson 1985), American perceptions of Soviet communism during the "high" cold war era (Holsti 1967), the American decision to intervene in Vietnam (Khong 1992), the years of détente as represented by the beliefs of Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977), and the rise and décline of a world order approach during the Carter administration (Rosati 1987).
In order to describe foreign policy beliefs and images, it is important to determine the relevant policymakers involved in the formulation of policy. Most scholars who have systematically studied the foreign policy perceptions and beliefs of politi¬cal leaders from a cognitive perspective hâve tended to focus on one key leader, such as Holsti's (1967) study of John Foster Dulles or Walker's (1977) study of Henry Kissinger. Also, a government and sometimes even a Society has been treated as a single actor—that is, the equivalent of a single individual—such as in White's (1968) general discussion of mirror images or Heradstveit's (1979) analysis of the




A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 61
Arab-Israeli conflict. Although analyzing an individual leader minimizes the empiri-cal problems of identifying the content of beliefs, it considerably simplifies the "collective" nature of most decision making and the differences in beliefs that one might find across individuals (Steinbruner 1974). Some of the more recent work in this area has attempted to be more sophisticated in the cognitive analysis of foreign policy, as demonstrated by Larson's (1985) study of Harriman, Truman, Byrnes, and Acheson within the Truman administration; Rosati's (1987) study of Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance (and Muskie) within the Carter administration; and Khong's (1992) study of Lyndon fohnson and his advisers during the Vietnam policymaking process. More studies need to identify the critical individuals within the policvmak-ing process and examine the contents of their beliefs and the decision-making dynamics between them so as to better understand the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.
Also, most of the work on the contents of beliefs has centered on the policy-makers of the great powers, especially the United States, and has focused on the "high policy" issues of national security and international conflict, a possible legacy of the initial interest by political psychologists in addressing the paramount ques-tions of war and peace.15 Clearly, cognitive studies of images of the enemy and mirror images; crises (see, e.g., Holsti 1990; Lebow 1981 ); deterrenee theory (see, e.g., Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Snyder 1978); and intelligence warning and sur¬prise attack (see, e.g., Betts 1978; Wohlstetter 1962) have contributed to a better understanding of the dynamics of international conflict and war. At the same time, much more needs to be done in systematically examining the contents of beliefs about "low policy" issues such as international economies and the environment and in studying images of other actors from other parts of the world using a cognitive perspective.16
The Structure of Beliefs
The development of political psychology and the cognitive study of foreign policy has contributed to a better understanding of the structure of beliefs in the minds of individuals in a political setting. Both cognitive consistency theory and schema theory agree that central beliefs are consequential, although they differ about the level of coherence and interconnectedness between beliefs. On the one hand, the literature on cognitive consistency theory emphasizes that individuals acquire beliefs and images that are interconnected and form coherent belief Systems. This was the basis, for example, of some of the earlier research approaches, such as the study of the image of the enemy as represented by Holsti's (1967) examination of lohn Foster Dulles or the study of an individual's general orientation toward political life found in the operational code approach. On the other hand, the literature on social cogni-tion theory and schema theory describes cognitive structures within the minds of individuals as quite complex and messy. From this perspective, people's beliefs tend to be much less coherent, less interconnected, and more contradictory than originally conceived by cognitive consistency theory.
As the more recent studies demonstrate, both cognitive patterns are likely. Larson's (1985) study of the origins of the cold war found that only Acheson had a coherent belief System about world politics. Harriman, Byrnes, and especially

62 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
Truman had much less coherent beliefs and were more prone to make sense of world developments and Soviet behavior in ways that were consistent with schema, attribu-tion, and self-perception theory. It was only in 1947 that a more coherent belief System crystallized for these policymakers around an enemy image of the Soviet Union and a policy of containment. Likewise, Rosati (1987) found both sets of cog-nitive patterns operating in his study of the Carter administration. Whereas Vance and Brzezinski maintained relatively coherent belief Systems throughout, Carter s beliefs became increasingly inconsistent during 1978 to the point that, by 1979, he was constantly wavering between Vance's more optimistic image and Brzezinski's increasingly pessimistic one, until eventually siding with Brzezinski's interpretation of world politics in 1980.
What can possibly account for these contrasting cognitive structures suggested by cognitive consistentcy and schema theory? It appears that much depends on the individual, on his or her background, personal development, and role. According to studies on the differences between "experts and novices," coherent images of phenom-ena are more likely to be formed if individuals have developed considerable expertise and experience relative to those phenomena. Fragmented, inconsistent, and contra -dictory beliefs are more likely to exist for phenomena about which individuals have given little thought or have acquired little knowledge and experience (see, e.g., Lau and Erber 1985; Lau and Sears 1986c; Milburn 1991), From this perspective it is not surprising that Acheson, Brzezinski, and Vance each an expert in foreign policy with considerable experience developed relatively coherent belief Systems, while Harriman (to a Lesser extent), Byrnes, Truman, and Carter as politicians and nonex-perts were more prone to uncommitted thinking {see Larson 1985, 346).
Such an interpretation is consistent with the emphasis placed bv cognitive theo-rists over the years on the importance of the situation for perception and cognition ( Fiske and Taylor 199] ; Milburn 1991 ; Rokeach 1968). Different situations are likely to trigger different schemas and sets of beliefs.17 This is one of the major conclusions drawn by Herrmann ( 1985) in his work on the role of the enemy, degenerate, and child stereotypes in Soviet foreign policy. And such differences in images are likely to vary among individuals. Although individuals are likely to have little difficulty making sense of situations that are relatively stable and familiar in terms of their beliefs, situa¬tions of great complexity and uncertainty may result in significant cognitive inconsistency and confusion, especially if individuals do not have considerable knowl-edge and well-developed belief Systems for imposing some degree of understanding on the environment. This may help account for why Truman administration policy-makers were vulnerable to such inconsistency in their beliefs and dependent on the mechanisms of schema, attribution, and self-perception theory (Larson 1985)— clearly, the immediate post-World War II years were a time of great uncertainty and flux in global developments, similar to the current collapse of communism and the rise of the so-called post-cold war era. This may also explain why policymakers are prone to rely on historical analogies, as Khong ( 1992) found in his study of Vietnam decision making. Such cognitive responses by policymakers in differing times and set-tings needs to be explored further.18



A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 63
Continuity and Change in Beliefs
Acognitive approach to foreign policy also contributes to an understanding about the extent to which policymakers' beliefs are likely to change over time. Cognitive theory, as informed by the literature on both cognitive consisteney and schemas, is based on the premise that central beliefs are the most consequential in understanding the process of perception and cognition, As described by Milton Rokeach, "First, not all beliefs are equally important to the individual; beliefs vary along a central-peripheral dimension. Second, the more central a belief, the more it will resist change. Third, the more central the belief changed, the more widespread the repercussions in the rest of the belief System" ( 1968, 3; see also Bem 1970).
Beyond this common core, cognitive consisteney and schema theory differ as to the likelihood and nature of attitudinal change. Cognitive consisteney theory tends to emphasize the overall rigidity of belief Systems due to their interconnectedness and, should change occur, the abrupt and all-encompassing nature of belief System change. As explained by Jervis (1976, 170), "If a person's attitude structure is to be consistent, then incremental changes among interconnected elements cannot be made. Change will be inhibited, but once it occurs, it will corne in large batches. Several elements will change almost simultaneously." A number of studies from different cognitive research programs support such an explanation. Hotsti (1967) found that Dulles's enemy image of the Soviet Union was fundamentally constant over time. Heradstveit (1979) found stability in Arab and israeli images throughout the 1970s, while Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble (1979), employing cognitive mapping, found no difference in the belief Systems of American policymakers before and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Harvey Starr (1984) reviewed the literature on Henry Kissinger's foreign policy beliefs and found considerable stability in his preoffice, officiai, and post-office beliefs. Finally, Ben-Zvi (1978) found that the images of Japan held by American leaders were dramatically altered following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the fighting of the war in the Pacific, as predicted by cognitive consistency theory.
Schema theory, on the other hand, stipulates that beliefs are much more isolated and inconsistent with each other, and hence are less resistant and more open to piecemeal, incremental changes over time. This is what Larson (1985) found in her study of the origins of the cold war: the years 1944 to 1947 represented constant fluc-tuation in the beliefs of Harriman, Byrnes, and Truman, who moved sporadically but inevitably toward an enemy image of the Soviet Union. Likewise Rosati (1987) found that not only did Carter experience changes in his beliefs and increasingly waver between Vance's and Brzezinski's opposing views over a period of two years, Brzezinski also experienced considerable change in his worldview over time: relatively optimistic during 1977, skeptical of Soviet behavior and its implications for world order after the Ethiopian-Somali war in early 1978, and increasingly pessimistic about Soviet expansionism by 1979.
What the various studies suggest is that patterns involving both belief stability and change may in fact occur. According to cognitive consistency theory, the more coherent and interconnected the belief system, the more resistant to change and, should change occur, the more likely that it will be abrupt and profound. At the same time, from the perspective of schema theory, the fragmented and inconsistent nature


64 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
of most people's beliefs indicates that incremental changes may also occur with some frequency. Both patterns were observed by Larson (1985) and Rosati (1987) in their studies of Truman and Carter administration policymakers over time. In this respect it is important to remember that while consistency theory and schema theory have different implications for belief system change, both emphasize the Level of centrality of beliefs: the more central the belief, the more stable and resistant it is to change.
These two patterns of stability and change are consistent with the earlier dis-cussion of the structure of beliefs, and probably for the very same reasons: much depends on individual background and personal development, the role occupied, and the situation at hand. According to Rosati (1987, 30), "While individuals strive to maintain consistency and the communication of information acts to reinforce one's belief system, images may still undergo change under certain conditions." He specifically highlighted the role of individual personality, external events, and domestic forces to explain the continuity of Vance’s image and the changes in Brzezinski's and Carter's images. As summarized by Rosati (1987, 102-3):
While Carter's personality was open to new information, Brzezinski's insecurity and rigid personality prompted his return to a previously held image. Major events played a critical role in shaping their alternative views: Soviet and Cuban interventionism in Africa was particularly crucial for Brzezinski; the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for Carter. And finally, the development of a more pessimistic image for Brzezinski and particularly for Carter was reinforced by the changing mood of the country in a more nationalistic and conservative direction.
Larson (1985) also offered a rich explanation, although less systematic in conceptualization, in examining continuity and change in the beliefs of Truman policymakers. Clearly, further study of the patterns of continuity and change in the beliefs of policymakers is warranted.
Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior
A considerable amount of research has been conducted in analyzing the significance of individual attitudes and beliefs: describing their content, structure, and relative degree of stability over time. All of this work has been based on one fundamental assumption: that beliefs are major sources of behavior and, therefore, explain and predict human action. Unfortunately, this assumption is so embedded in the attitudinal research that the relationship between beliefs and behavior has rarely been tested and demonstrated. The following comment by Fishbein and Aizen (1975, 355) pertains to the present day: "Despite the commitment of the social sciences to the study of human behavior, relatively little research in the attitude area has investigated overt behavior as such." The results of the few studies conducted in social and political psychology have been inconsistent and indicate that the link between individual beliefs and behavior is quite complex and varied (see Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985; Calder and Ross 19/3; Deutscher 1973; Oskamp 1977; Wicker 1969).
A similar problem exists with a cognitive approach to foreign policy. Holsti (1976, 52), in his review of the literature, found that the linkage between foreign pol-icy beliefs and behavior has rarely been tested. "It is not uncommon to find in the

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 65
Conclusion a statement to the effect that, 'the preceding analysis of X's belief system established its utility for understanding X's political behavior.1 Less often do we find AN explicit and compelling demonstration of why this is the case." George (1979b): Has outlined two basic techniques for determining the impact of policymakers' Beliefs on behavior: the process-tracing procedure and the congruence procedure. Each has been applied, although only in very select cases, to better understand this relationship between beliefs and behavior.
The process tracing procedure "seeks to establish the ways in which the actor's Beliefs influenced his receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about die situation, his definition of the situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally, his choice of a course of action" (George 1979b, 113). By Closely examining the process of decision making, process tracing is able to establish Causality. However, it tends to be oriented around a specific case study and requires large amounts of detailed information about the decision-making process not readily available. The major study operating within a process-tracing perspective is Larson's , 1985) study of the Truman administration.19 Relying on archival data, Larson found that although individual beliefs did influence individual behavior, what was more surprising was that policymakers' beliefs about the Soviet Union often flowed from their decisions, as suggested by self-perception theory. These contradictory patterns indicate the complexity of the belief-behavior relationship, which, as suggested earlier, may have been accentuated by the fluidity and uncertainty of the immediate post-World War II era.
The congruence. Procedure examines the level of consistency between the con¬tent of the beliefs and the content of the decision outcome. Since the congruence procedure focuses on the level of association between beliefs and behavior, it cannot determine causality although it requires much less specific information about the decision-making process and allows for broad generalizations over time. The few studies conducted also point to the existence of contradictory patterns. Starr (1984) found that Kissinger's images of the Soviet Union and China were not consistent with American behavior toward the Soviet Union and China. However, when Walker 11975, 1977) examined the relationship between Kissinger's beliefs and his bargaining behavior toward the Soviet Union, the Arab Israeli conflict, and the Vietnam War, he found consistency. Loch Johnson (1977, 85) studied the operational code of Senator Frank Church and found a strong correlation between Church's "beliefs and subsequent voting behavior which reinforces my impression (as participant observer) of his belief-behavior consistency." In Rosati's (1987) comparison of the beliefs of Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance with the administration^ major foreign policy behavior over four years, he found both sets of belief-behavior patterns. He found that the Carter administration’s foreign policy behavior was extremely consistent with its beliefs during 1977 and 1980, in contrast to 1978 and 1979, when the consis¬tency between behavior and beliefs declined considerably. The major factor accounting for these differing patterns was the level of consensus in beliefs among Carter's policymakers—a high level of shared beliefs promoted congruent foreign policy behavior, but little congruency existed when consensus in beliefs broke down.
One of the impressive aspects of the study of Vietnam policymaking by Khong (1992) is that he relies on both procedures—process tracing and congruence to

66 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
demonstrate how historical analogies affect decisions. Despite such efforts to explain decision-making and foreign policy behavior as a function of the beliefs held by policymakers, this is a topic that needs considerably more exploration and study. Ultimately, as described by George, beliefs "serve as a prism or filter that influences the actor's perception and diagnosis of political situations and that provides norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of action in specific situations. Neither his diagnosis of situations nor his choice of action for dealing with them is rigidly prescribed and determined by these beliefs" (1980b, 45). Although beliefs often impact behavior, many other causal factors also play a role in influencing for¬eign policy behavior.
The Context and Study of Beliefs
If a cognitive approach is to provide a useful understanding of foreign policy, the scholar must remain sensitive to the role other psychological characteristics have along with governmental, domestic, and global dynamics in forming both policy-maker beliefs and foreign policy. The early work on cognitive approaches to foreign policy was sensitive to such complexity.20 For example, Holsti (1967) discussed the effect of personality on Dulles's image of the enemy, while White (1968) highlighted the psychological, social, and cultural sources of mirror images. However, as social scientists became increasingly specialized and systematic in their studies of political psychology during the late sixties and seventies, contextual factors such as the role of personality and the larger environment were increasingly ignored. As Ben-Zvi {1976-77, 90) has observed, the cognitive literature in foreign policy has tended to "de-emphasize the multitude of interwoven factors.1'
Over the past decade a number of political psychologists have pointed out the need for a broader conceptualization that integrates psychological characteristics associated with emotion, motivation, and personality within a more cognitive approach to better understand human behavior and interaction. Lebow (1981), for instance, has demonstrated how the management of brinkmanship crises is heavily affected by both cognitive and motivational characteristics of policymakers. Likewise, Tetlock and Levi ( 1982) concluded in their review of the literature that the future will likely see the integration of cognitive and motivational explanations. In his study of the Carter administration, Rosati (1987) explained policymaker image stability and change from a cognitive perspective that also incorporated the role of individual per¬sonality. Walker (1990) reviewed how the operational code originally had a broad conceptualization that included the integral role of personality, which he argues needs to be reintegrated in future research. This is consistent with the observation by Fiske and Taylor concerning the growing trend in the study of social cognition: "Having developed considerable sophistication about people's cognitive processes, researchers are beginning to appreciate anew the interesting and important influ¬ences of motivation [personality] on cognition" (1991, 13).
Such sensitivity to the need to integrate other relevant factors to better explain foreign policy within a cognitive perspective has grown over the years. Jervis (1976), for instance, relied upon a "two-step" mode! in which perceptions and beliefs served as the "proximate" cause of foreign policy decision making that also was affected by the role of bureaucracy, domestic determinants, and the international environment.

_A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 67
Likewise, Larson (1985, 326) provided a "multilevel explanation" in which "theories at different levels of analysis—systemic, domestic political, and individual cognitive processes—were applied to historical case material" to provide a rich explanation of the origins of American cold war policies. Similarly, Rosati's (1987, 168) study "was based on a framework that integrates theoretical work developed at four different lev-els: the individual, group, societal, and the international environment," including an examination of the role of personality, external events, and domestic forces to explain continuity and change in the beliefs of Carter administration officials. Such a multi-level foundation is needed to ensure that cognitive studies of foreign policy do not fall victim to the charge of reductionism and irrelevance that they experienced early on.
In fact, one of the promises of a cognitive approach is that beliefs usually act as a causal nexus—that is, as a filter through which other factors pass (George 1979b; Rosati 1987, 168-70). Beliefs are naturally positioned between the environment and behavior. Gordon All port, one of the founders of attitudinal research in psychology, long ago recognized the potential of beliefs to serve as a causal nexus: "Background factors never directly cause behavior, they cause attitudes (and other mental sets) and the latter in turn determine behavior" ( 1931, 173). In order to better understand for-eign policy, such a perspective must be embedded within a decision-making context that identifies the relevant policymakers and is sensitive to the nature of the policy-making process (see, e.g., de Rivera 1968; Rosati 1981, 1987, 17-19; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Steinbruner 1974). The major advantage of treating beliefs as a causal nexus is the synthesis of both environmental and psychological factors for understanding foreign policy. At the same rime, since the focus of a cognitive approach is on the "psychological environment1' of the policymaker, the scholar must remain sensitive to integrating the direct influence of the "objective environment" as well so as to ensure a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy (see Sprout and Sprout 1965).
The discussion of the context of beliefs and the need for multilevel explanations parallels the evolution of research strategies employed to study beliefs and their impact on foreign policy. Most studies have taken a case study approach, usually relying on some form of content analysis of information (such as public statements, private memoranda, oral interviews), often supplemented by other sources, to infer the beliefs of policymakers (see, e.g., Tetlock 1983b). Earlier studies tended to be more historical, qualitative, and often eclectic in examining beliefs, as represented by the initial work on images of the enemy, mirror images, and the operational code. With the rise of behavioralism, studies became much more systematic and quantita¬tive, particularity those using the cognitive mapping approach. More recent studies have attempted to integral the strengths of these two orientations by being both theoretically and methodologically systematic. These have also been open to diverse and increasingly eclectic research strategies—some more qualitative {see Herrmann 1985; Larson 1985, 1988), others more quantitative (see Herrmann 1986), and some employing both techniques (see Khong 1992; Rosati 1987). Such recent advances in methodological diversity and sophistication are consistent with the general rise of "post positivism" in the study of international relations (see Lapid 1989), offering much promise to the future application of cognitive approaches to the study of for¬eign policy,

68 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
■ Conclusion: The Power of a Cognitive Approach
As we have seen, a cognitive approach provides considerable explanatory and predictive power in the study of foreign policy. Although much remains to be done to resolve the contradictory findings and to address the gaps of knowledge that con¬tinue to exist, the second generation of scholarship has become increasingly sensitive to studying the role of beliefs and perception in ail of its complexity. Past studies have demonstrated that the beliefs and cognitive processes of policymakers affect how they see the world and what actions the)' take within the policymaking process. Not only does such a cognitive perspective provide invaluable insights into the formula-tion and conduct of foreign policy, it helps us belter understand the dynamics of world politics (Rosati 1987, 170-79).
As stated by Richard Ned Lebow in Between Peace and War, "The proximate causes of conflict such as the role of beliefs and perceptions] may even be as impor-tant as the underlying ones if a crisis can determine whether long-standing tensions are ultimately eased or lead to war" (1981, 4). This explains the disproportionate amount of attention that international crises have received in the study of foreign policy—a time when individuals and their psychological characteristics can dramatically affect the outcome. How crises are resolved "can determine whether war breaks out or peace is maintained. They can also intensify or ameliorate the underlying sources of conflict in cases where war is averted" (Lebow 1981, 334). Consequently, a cognitive perspective also has considerable policy relevance for the policymaker and the citizen, for it can contribute to the diagnosis of the situation surrounding policy by minimizing common perceptual errors while enriching an understanding of the psychological aspects of human and international interaction (see, e.g., Tetlock 1986; White 1986). Ultimately, a cognitive perspective serves as a useful! corrective to the rational actor perspective that many scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners, as well as individual citizens, often rely on to make sense of the dynamics of foreign policy and world politics.
■ Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jean Garrison, Michael l.ink, Roger Moore, Robert Shaw, and Steve Twing for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Notes
A point of clarification: political scientist- usually make a distinction between the con¬cept of cognition involving beliefs, perception, and the processing of information) and the concept of personality (involving emotion and ego-defensive and motivational characteristics). Psychologists, on the other hand, usually treat "personality" as a broad, generic concept that incorporates beliefs, perception, emotion, motivation, and ail other individual psychological characteristics (see Greenstein 1975, chapter 1). This chapter reflects the perspective of the political scientist, preferring to distinguish between cognition and personality so as to add clarity to the discussion'.

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy 69
2. Informative overviews of the general study of political psychology and its application to
international relations over the years can be found in Kelman ( 1965a), Knutson (1973 )
Hermann {1977), Falkowski (1979), Hopple (1982), Hermann (1986), White{ 1986)* ' and Singer and Hudson (1992). For a wide-ranging essay on the integral nature of "the
image (or knowledge and life in a variety of contexts, see Boulding ( 1956).
3. An excellent earlier overview can be found in de Rivera (1968).
4. According to Richard Lau and David Sears (1986a) in their introduction to political cognition, Social cognition began to dominate the study of attitudes in social psychology only by the late 1970s, the central journal had incorporated the term by 1980 and the first major textbook in the area had appeared by 1984" (Fiske and Taylor 1984, 7).
5. For early statements anticipating this perspective while cognitive consistency theory still reigned supreme, see Bem ( 1970) and Rokeach (1968).
6. This is a more fruitful approach than attempting a comprehensive review of the vast body of cognitive oriented scholarship in foreign policy that has accumulated over the Years. There are also other relevant bodies of knowledge that impact on cognition, including the role of personality, group and organizational decision making, and the societal-cultural context. For an excellent but incomplete review of the literature see Vertzberger ( 1990; see also Tetlock and McGuire 1985). It also should be pointed out that there has been a strong tradition of biographies, histories, and policy studies that often involve analysis, although informally and implicitly, from a psychological (and cognitive) perspective. Although these works are often quite informative and insightful (see, e.g., Tuchman 1984 ), the focus of this review is on foreign policy studies that are informed explicitly by psychological theory and research in the area of cognition.
7. For other studies of images of the enemy, see Ben-Zvi ( 19751, Lampton 11971) Stuart and Starr ( 1981-82), and Welch ( 1970:, as well as the collection of essays in Farrell and Smith : 196, ) and Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen( 1967); the two-step mediated stimulus response model applied to state interaction during the World War I and Cuban missile crises ! Holsti, Brody, and North 1965; Holsti, North, and Brody I 968; North 1967)- as well as the analysis by historian Daniel Yergin ( 1977) of the origins of the cold war due to the displacement of the "Yalta" axioms during the Roosevelt administration by the
Riga axioms under the Truman administration. A more conceptual discussion of national images can he found in Boulding, 1959).
8. Holsti:1967) also discusses the role of personality on attitude change.
9. For other mirror image studies, see Rronfenbienner ( 1961 l, Gamson and Modinliam
( 19,1 K and Stoessmger i 1967, 1971 . See also Charles Osgood's (1966 ) graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension-reduction" (GRIT) for reducinc international conflict applied in the context ot cold war mirror images.
10. For an excellent overview of the evolution of the operational code approach and its relationship to the literature on cognitive consistency, see Walker (1990).
11 ■ For other studies using the operational code approach, see Holsti [1970), Johnson ( 19/, ;, Starr (1984, Stuart and Starr 1981-82), and Tweraser ( 1974).
12. Other examples of cognitive mapping can be found in Bonham and Shapiro ( 1977) Bonham et al. ( 1978 ), and Hart ( 3 97" i.
13. Other foreign policy studies emphasizing the perspective of attribution theory include Heradstveit and Bonham ( 1986) and Heuer (1980).
14. Although it is relatively common today to find psycho biographies and international relations scholarship that integrate a psychological perspective within their work, only a few have focused on a cognitive approach and applied it to the study of foreign policy

70 Second-Generation Foreign Policy Analysis
In addition to the four scholars highlighted in this section, see the studies by cottam
1986);,MC Calla (1992 )and Shimko ( 1992) as wel1 as the edited "volume by Sylvan and Chan (1984). For sources that otter broader reviews of political Psychology in general
and its application to international relations, sec note 2.
15. The major exception to the rule has been the more varied literature on cognitive mapping.
16. One dearly must be sensitive to the implications of applying a Western, especially American 0riented, cognitive approach to different societies with different cultures See Price-Williams (1985), Putnam ( 1973), Pye (1986), and Shweder and Sullivan (1993).
17. As Lau and Sears have stated, "Certain information will be highly relevant to some peo¬ples schemata (and therefore easily processed, stored, and later recalled) and at the same time totally irrelevant to other people's schemata (and therefore not processed or remembered) (1986c, 355).
18. These differences have led scholars to examine the level of' cognitive complexity Drawn from cognitive consistency and schema theory, the assumption is that policy-makers who demonstrate greater cognitive complexity has-e a more sophisticated ' understanding of the world, are more open to new information, and are less likely to choose strident alternatives when making decisions. See, for example, some of the cognitive mapping studies (Axelrod 1976) and the work of Philip Tetlock ( 1983a, 1985)
19. Sec also, Ben-Zvi (1975). There have been numerous in-depth foreign policy historical and case studies developed over the years that may be informative about policymaker beliefs and their impact on foreign policy, but most do not emphasize a cognitive approach to foreign policy. Jervis (1976) provides an excellent review of this literature for illustrating patterns of perception and misperception in foreign policy.
20. See for example, de Rivera ( 1968.; Farrell and Smith (1967); Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen ( 1967 ); Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin : 1962 ).
الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل
salim 1979
التميز الذهبي
التميز الذهبي



تاريخ الميلاد : 27/05/1979
العمر : 45
الدولة : الجزائر
عدد المساهمات : 5285
نقاط : 100012179
تاريخ التسجيل : 06/11/2012

A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Empty
مُساهمةموضوع: The use of military force to promote human rights   A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy Emptyالثلاثاء نوفمبر 13, 2012 11:31 pm

The use of military force to promote human rights
James D. Meernik, Steven C. Poe, and
Erum Shaikh
Introduction
Among the major, stated goals of the military action in Iraq has been the US administration’s desire to replace the Saddam Hussein dictatorship with a regime that would serve as a model for human rights and democracy in the Middle East. Thought controversial by many because it may represent a bad precedent, as well as a sea change in American foreign policy, the use of force for these purposes is really not that unusual in a broad historical context. Throughout history, states have frequently used military force to impose political systems upon other societies. Owen (2002: 375) chronicled 198 such cases that have occurred since 1555. And like the current case, most such efforts have involved the forceful imposition of a regime by a powerful country on a weaker target state.
And in most of these the powerful state has sought to impose on the target country a set of political institutions that more closely resembles its own.
The extent to which such uses of force have been successful at bringing about more human rights in societies is debatable. Scholars are now beginning to analyze the success of attempts to impose liberal, democratic systems on nations (Fossedal 1989; Smith 1994; Peceny 1995, 1999; Meernik 1996; McDougall 1997; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Whitcomb 1998). Such research has emphasized the extent to which a system of democratic governance has been established in a nation whose prior regime did not subscribe to democratic norms. These analyses have largely focused on macro-level, systemic and constitutional changes in government institutions.
We are interested, however, in exploring the degree to which these uses of force have been able to effect change at the micro, or individual level. While regime change may presage an improvement of conditions in a society, the changes may only be in law and not in fact. The procedural aspects of democratization may be realized in the course of these military interventions, as new constitutions are written and elections held. Yet the substance of democracy may lag behind if elected officials and citizens do not fully subscribe to critical, democratic norms such as civil liberties, tolerance, and the foreswearance of violence as a political tool.
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One aim of this chapter is to provide the first assessment of whether these uses of force have acted to improve the substance of democracy – the right to speak one’s own mind, to practice one’s religion and simply to live peacefully, free of the fear of imprisonment and government-sponsored violence. As such, this study also constitutes a useful addition to the literature that seeks to ascertain the relationship between human rights and a variety of foreign policy tools (e.g., Stohl Carleton and Johnson 1984, Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Regan 1995; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Blanton 1994; 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Given the fact that the literature has examined the impact of foreign economic and military aid and arms transfers in some detail, it is rather surprising that no one has yet systematically analyzed the relationship between human rights and US uses of force, which are arguably the most serious of foreign policy commitments, and certainly the most visible. Most importantly of all, we seek to deepen our understanding of one of the key elements of a sustainable peace in nations that have undergone conflict – their level of human rights protection. Governments that abuse their citizens’ human rights may well be more likely to experience repeated patterns of internal and/or external forms of violence and conflict.
Their abusive policies may precipitate challenges from within and attempts from without to impose a new government more respectful of human rights. Thus, evaluating the extent to which uses of force result in an improvement of the human rights situation in the target state is critical to understanding the prospects of a sustainable peace in that society.
Toward this end, we will examine uses of force by the United States across all nations of the world, using data for the period 1977–1996. We find that the regimes that are subjected to uses of force by the United States are a distinct set of nations, distinguished from others by their regime types. Having examined which nations the USA has used force in, we next analyze our primary question of interest: the impact of such military
actions on the lives of people in the target nation. We argue that if US uses of force are indeed successful at promoting human rights, then the success or failure of uses of force is apt to be a function of their type, size, and duration.
Our findings indicate that though democracy and human rights are among the considerations that determine whether the USA does intervene in a particular case, these uses of force are ineffective at promoting improvements in these conditions.

Explaining the use of military force by the United States
To explain the consequences of US uses of military force, we begin by examining the events to which the USA is responding. We make one seemingly obvious, but important assumption – that United States foreign policymakers are more interested in some foreign crises than others. Our
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purpose is not to enumerate all the types of events and conditions that make some events of concern to US foreign policymakers and not others.
Instead, we seek to explain how a nation’s domestic political system and regime policies affect US foreign policy toward that nation. Are US foreign policymakers’ perceptions of the importance of a threat posed by some nation influenced in any degree by these domestic, political conditions in that country? And do such interests increase the likelihood that the United States will use military force to influence events in these nations? We believe the answer to both questions to be “yes.” The first step in our analysis of the relationship between human rights and the use of force is to explain why we believe internal political conditions influence the likelihood of US military action.
The promotion of liberalism and the US use of force
The United States has long been interested in promoting liberalist values in its foreign policies (Fossedal 1989; Smith 1994; Peceny 1995, 1999; Meernik 1996; McDougall 1997; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Whitcomb1998). In contrast to realists, who would argue that promoting democracy or human rights is rare in a security-oriented, anarchic international system, many of these scholars have found that the United States has increasingly used force to remake other societies. This is not altogether surprising for other researchers have argued that there are substantial opportunities and incentives for a powerful state to remake the world in its own image (Krasner 1978: 340) and to socialize leaders in other states to its norms and values (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Indeed, even Hans Morgenthau (1973: 10) once wrote, “All nations are tempted—and few have been able to resist the temptation for long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.”
Recent research by Owen (2002) confirms that states have forcibly imposed domestic institutions on other states throughout history. Ideologically inspired military interventions have seemingly become more feasible
and prevalent with the end of the Cold War, but as Peceny (1999) demonstrates, the USA embarked on such missions during and before the Cold War as well. Peceny finds that in almost one-third of US military interventions in the twentieth century, presidents sought to achieve liberal democratic aims abroad. Most recently, one of the five major objectives of US military strategy in the Annual Defense Report 2000 is fostering an international environment in which “Democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted.”1
First, we hypothesize that the United States will be interested in the extent to which a nation subscribes to liberal, democratic values.
The democratic peace research program has shown that democratic regimes tend not to make war on each other (Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). More recently, scholars are finding
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that when democracies do enter conflicts, it is often because they are targeted by non-democratic states (Leeds and Davis 1999; Prins and Sprecher 1999). Democratic regimes also tend to be more co-operative in general in
their international behavior (Benoit 1996; Leeds and Davis 1999). Huth (1998) finds that major powers are more likely to intervene in conflicts when they are seeking to protect a politically similar regime from a third nation that does not share their polity characteristics. Polity type is highly predictive of how states treat one another because of the tendency for like states to flock together because of shared norms.
Second, and more importantly, we believe that the specific policies pursued by governments should also explain their proclivity for conflict involvement and the likelihood that the USA will use force against them.
Governments that are fair and responsive to their citizens do not provoke the scope or intensity of opposition that generates unrest at home and escalates into conflict with other regimes. For example, the states of
Europe tend not to provoke militarized, international crises by their policies toward their own citizens, while some governments in Africa and Asia have become enmeshed in crises because of their repressive nature.
Regimes that do not respect the human rights of their citizens are also typical of regimes that centralize power and possess far greater latitude to act repressively at home and aggressively abroad. Ultimately, repression and/or aggression are at the hub of most international crises and uses of force, and so we should find those states whose regimes utilize these tools as normal political practice will be the site of many of these crises of interest to the United States, and therefore will be targeted with military force.
Hypothesis 1: The United States will be more likely to use force the less democratic the target state.2
Hypothesis 2: The United States will be more likely use force the less respectful the target state is toward its citizens’ human rights.3
Initial bivariate explorations
The dependent variable, FORCE, is coded “1” for each country in the world for each year in which the USA used force and “0” otherwise in the period 1976–1996. Data on the political use of force were gathered from Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Job and Ostrom (1986), Zelikow (1987),
The Center for Naval Analyses: ‘The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990’, and the Global Security web site.4 A political use of military force short of war is defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978: 12) as physical actions . . . taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national
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authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. Empirically-oriented researchers are well aware that viewing simple bivariate relationships can sometimes lead to erroneous conclusions, as seemingly important relationships can appear that are in fact spurious, or alternatively, that significant relationships can be hidden (i.e., Lewis-Beck 1980). However, the old maxim that “a picture is worth a thousand words” has a certain appeal, and our experience has taught us that sometimes simple visual analyses can lead to a greater understanding of patterns in the data than would be possible from the inspection of multivariate analyses
alone.
By examining figures that show trends in countries’ levels of democracy, and respect for human rights, we can gain an idea of the likelihood that hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by data. In Figure 8.1 we depict the average Polity III democracy scores (a scale ranging from 0–10) during the time period under study, in years prior to US uses of force, at time t.
Figure 8.1 paints an interesting picture of the relationship between democracy and US military actions. The mean democracy scores in cases where US actions were to later occur are much lower than those to be found in countries where no such use of force would happen. Six years prior to an impending US military action, the average democracy score was just under 0.4, very near the bottom of the democracy scale. Democracy scores in other countries at that time, and across the period were by no means stellar, with means of around 3.5 to 4, on the bottom half of the scale, but they were substantially greater than in the countries where the USA was to later intervene, and statistically significantly (p<0.001).
Also interesting are the trends in both series across time. One sees an

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upward trend in democracy in both series, indicative of a global trend toward democratization during this period of time. The upward trend in democracy is somewhat greater among nations that would later experience a US use of force, perhaps because countries on the “0” end of the Polity Democracy spectrum cannot possibly see decreases in their democracy scores, whereas a certain percentage of cases achieving higher scores are apt to do so. The mean democracy score at the time of the use of force is 1.26, as compared to 3.89 in cases where the USA does not use force, a difference which is still highly significant (p<0.001). We can conclude from
this analysis, then, that the US tends to use force in a subset of cases that are very low in democracy, a finding consistent with Hypothesis 1. Further, when one examines the overall trend toward democracy one may also notice that the progress tends to halt one year prior to US military actions, as the democracy scores actually decrease from 1.08 to 1.05 from t_2 to t_1. Admittedly this decrease is very small, but it is suggestive that perhaps in some instances US uses of force could result from downturns in democracy, in addition to levels in that variable at a particular point in time. In Figure 8.2 we present trends in human rights scores, as measured by the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale, which ranges from 1 to 5 (where “1” is best for human rights practices and “5” is “worst”), and deals primarily with “personal integrity rights,” the right not to be imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, executed, or murdered, either arbitrarily or for one’s views. Here we see that countries that would experience US military actions are indeed substantially more repressive than others in the period leading up to that event.
As in our first figure, differences between

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the group experiencing uses of force and those that did not are statistically significant throughout the period (p<0.001).
The trend in human rights abuses is also suggestive, as one sees substantial increases in human rights abuses leading up to the military action, from 3.26, six years prior to the use of force; to 3.52 two years prior; 3.55, one year prior; and to 3.64 in the year of the military action. It does appear that the United States uses force in a subset of countries with rather undemocratic institutions and practices. However, though such analyses are suggestive, they are subject to difficulties since potentially important relationships with other explanations of the US use of force may have been overlooked.
The effects of US military actions on human rights: initial bivariate examination of trends
Now we consider the effects of US military actions on human rights. Our first analysis of this issue, which is presented in Figure 8.3, allows us to examine the evolution of human rights practices in the six years subsequent to US interventions, taking place at time t. We look at the level of respect for human rights, in US uses of force in general. However, the effects of uses of force might differ, depending on what kind of force is used, and the number of forces committed. We might theorize that, if one of the purposes of the US use of force is to increase respect for human rights, as indicated in the analyses conducted above, the use of ground forces represents an important threshold in terms of the level of commitment, and that uses of force that cross that threshold are apt to have a greater impact than if only naval or air forces are used.
A number of interesting patterns become evident in Figure 8.3. First, quite consistent with the findings in above sections, one notices that the

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mean human rights abuse scores for countries having experienced US military actions are substantially higher than those that have not throughout the seven-year period. This underscores our argument regarding the selection process that occurs as a result of the US using force in certain kinds of
cases.
More interesting findings are evident in the trends once military action takes place. The downward trend in human rights abuse scores, from just above 3.6 to between 3.2 and 3.4 indicate moderate improvements in human dignity in the six years subsequent to US military actions. Further, we see that human rights abuse scores are somewhat lower in cases where ground forces are introduced, consistent with the reasoning presented above. Though the differences are rather small, this bivariate analysis
when viewed alone may be interpreted as evidence to support the claim that US uses of force have been successful in improving human rights.
There is good reason to be skeptical of such a claim, however. Previous research has shown that countries that have human rights scores in that range have a tendency to decrease over time, as such repression is difficult to maintain for long periods of time (Tate et al. 2000), so one might expect
that a decrease in human rights abuse scores would have occurred even if no military action had taken place.
To test for this possibility, we created a “control group” consisting of a subset of countries with a similar mean human rights score at time t, which did not experience US uses of force. To make sure that the composition of the two sets of countries was as similar as possible, we took a random
sample of the countries not experiencing military action, stratified according to the level of the dependent variable (Figure 8.4). Specifically, we

chose four times, the number of cases, for each of the five points on the human rights scale, as were present in the group of countries that experienced uses of force. This resulted in two groups of countries in which levels of human rights abuse were identical (3.64) at time t. In one group US military action had occurred, and in another they had not. The results show that human rights abuses decrease substantially more quickly when the USA chooses not to use force. At time t+6 the sample of cases in which the USA had not used force had a mean human rights score of 2.67, as compared to the mean of 3.35 in countries which had experienced military action at the same point of time, a difference that was highly statistically significant (p<0.001).
From these bivariate results we have learned that human rights conditions tend to improve in the wake of US military action. That said, this is most likely due to the countries that have most often been the target of these uses of force having relatively serious human rights problems prior to the intervention. In a subset of countries with similar histories of human rights abuse, which did not experience US military action, human rights conditions improvement occurred more quickly.
If we were to judge the effects of US uses of force on human rights solely on the basis of these simple pictures, the tendency would be to conclude that such actions worsened human rights conditions from what they would otherwise be by slowing their improvement. The possibility of misleading
effects as a result of selection bias come into play here too, however, since the subset of countries experiencing uses of force have already been shown to be substantially different from those which did on a variety of different characteristics.
A better idea of the actual effects of US uses of force can be gained by including other potential determinants of human rights in a multivariate model of human rights abuse, along with US uses of force. We will do so, in the next section.
Testing the effects of US military action in a multivariate model

To yield results in which we can have more confidence, we employ a more sophisticated statistical model.5 We also employ a set of control variables derived from prior research on human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999) including: (1) level of democracy; (2) per capita GNP; (3) logged
population; (4) leftist government dummy variable; (5) military dictatorship dummy variable; (6) British colonial influence; (7) involvement in international war; (Cool involvement in civil war; (9) organized nonviolent rebellion; and (10) organized violent rebellion. The results are available upon request. Here we simply describe the relationships we find between the use of force and human rights. We use three different measures of the US use of force. The first is measured simply as the occurrence of any US use of military force. The second is measured as a major level US use of force.6 The third is measured as a use of military force involving the
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deployment of US ground forces.7 We employ the latter two variables to determine if a stronger commitment of the US military is needed to affect human rights. Major military actions are those that involve multiple units of air, land and/or sea forces that would be expected to provide a more visible and assertive US military presence. We would also expect that in instances where presidents ordered the deployment of US ground forces that the US government would possess greater leverage over the policies of the target regime. Ground forces are in a much stronger position to
affect change in a target country when they are used to secure a peace, patrol, and protect lives and property. Therefore, we expect that the more force used and the deployment of ground forces would be more associated with an increase in the protection of human rights. Each of these three, binary variables was lagged one-year, two-years and three-years to determine the length of time needed for force to actually influence, if at all, respect for human rights.
The effects of the three measures of uses of force on human rights are largely negligible. In the first set of measures we examined the effects of
all uses of force irrespective of size or type. Regardless of how many years
we lag the occurrence of a use of force (to allow time for human rights
practices to change within a country), the coefficients for the use of force
variables never attain statistical significance. Interestingly, the coefficient
for the one-year, lagged variable is negative, while the coefficients at twoand
three-year lags are positive. The impact of uses of force would appear
to change over time. At first, the use of force may lead to an increase in
respect for human rights, but later and perhaps after US forces have
departed the scene, the target nation experiences increasing violations.
One could imagine several possible scenarios associated with a use of
force. If US forces have left the target nation, that regime may be returning
to its previous and poor human rights policies, which may have triggered
the use of force. Whatever positive influence US military forces may
have on human rights may depend entirely on their continuing presence.
Or, it may be that the introduction of US forces creates greater instability
and political problems in the target country that lead to increasing violations
of human rights over time. The use of force may provoke opposition
or violence that the regime forcefully represses; it may be perceived by the
government as a green light to engage in abusive human rights practices
(especially if the use of force was in support of the regime); or it may lead
to a general breakdown in respect for the rule of law.
Perhaps the effects of a use of force are contingent upon the size and
type of military deployment. The President may need to order a substantial
deployment of US military personnel to cause a target regime to
modify its behavior. A flyover by the US Air Force, or a port visit by the
US Navy may not signal the depth of commitment required to effect a fundamental
change of human rights policies in the target regime. Therefore,
we next examined the effects of major uses of military force on human
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rights. The findings are very similar to what we just found. First, none of
the lagged measures of major uses of military force are statistically significant,
although the coefficient for the one-year lag comes very close. We also
see that the effect of a major use of force one year after its occurrence is
negative – such deployments improve human rights. However, the coefficients
for the two-year and three-year lags are positive. Over time, major
uses of force tend to lead to decreasing protection of human rights.
We are also interested in evaluating the effects of uses of force involving
ground troops. Again, we see that the coefficients for these variables at
one-year, two-year and three-year lags are all statistically insignificant.
However, the signs of the coefficients change twice in these estimates. One
year after the deployment of ground forces, the effect is small, but positive,
which indicates a decrease in protection of human rights. At two
years, the coefficient for the lagged variable is negative, but at three years
it becomes positive once again. While we do not wish to make too much of
these findings due to the statistical insignificance of the coefficients, it may
be that all such deployments are entirely dependent upon a host of other
factors we do not measure, such as the purpose of the mission, the relationship
between the United States and the target regime, and subsequent
events.
One final possibility that occurs to us is that the duration of a dispute
may exercise an impact on human rights and repression. Carothers (2000:
107) observed that intervening nations usually focus on the endpoint, i.e.,
an election, and not on the process of establishing necessary preconditions
to substantive democracy, such as securing freedom of speech or protest
thus, in effect, focusing on the symptoms instead of the causes of the
problem. Short-term interventions, when the intervening party leaves as
soon as order is restored or an election held, may not be effective in
improving human rights for these reasons. In contrast, in long-term, or socalled
“state building” enterprises there are efforts to rebuild a nation
from the ground up, establishing new laws, and trying to cultivate new
laws and norms in the target country. It could be that longer-term uses of
force are more effective, resulting in greater respect of human rights in the
target country, than in shorter-term uses of force. Alternatively, if US
occupation is bad for human rights, then longer military actions might be
found to be worse for human rights than shorter ones.
In order to test for these possibilities we created a new data set in which
the unit of analysis is an event in which the USA used force. We then calculated
a variable that measured the duration of each US military action,
for which data were available, in days.8 In order to observe the effect of
duration of uses of force on human rights within those countries that
experienced such actions, we re-ran again the base model, this time including
the duration of the use of force, lagged one, two, and three, years
respectively.
Once again, the findings offer us no firm evidence that the duration of
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US military actions make a difference for better or for worse. The coefficient
of the duration variable at lag one is closest to achieving statistical
significance (p<.07, two-tailed) indicating there is a good possibility that
duration has an effect. However, the positive sign indicates that the effect
of a longer duration (if there is one) is probably to increase human rights
abuses. Duration of the military action at the second lag has a negative
coefficient, while at the third lag the coefficient becomes positive again.
But these two variables do not approach conventional levels of statistical
significance.
Conclusion
In this study we have examined two closely interrelated, but nevertheless
distinct questions, “Why does the United States use force?” and, “What
are the ramifications for these uses of force for human rights practices
within the target countries?” Though they are distinct questions, to
address one without the other can produce only an incomplete story of the
relationship between human rights and the use of force.
Our findings are consistent with the claim that US military actions are
motivated by the desire to promote human rights, as human rights appear
to be one of the strongest predictors, if not the strongest predictor of US
uses of force. But, unfortunately, from a normative perspective, the results
also indicate that though the use of force by the US is partly motivated by
the desire to improve human rights in target countries, these actions do
not improve the substance of democracy in target nations; the degree to
which citizens are free to speak, worship, or simply to live peacefully, free
of the fear of imprisonment or acts of violence, by their governments.
We conducted a variety of analyses of the effects of uses of force on
human rights. We examined the effects of all US uses of force. We then
looked at a subset of the most serious uses of force, and then on those in
which ground forces were used. Finally, we used a variable that discriminated
between longer and shorter uses of force in countries that were the
targets of military action. And in each of these analyses we examined the
effects of uses of force at three separate lags. The results indicate rather
unambiguously that such military actions do not have any desirable impact
on human rights. Indeed, the findings suggested that if uses of force had
any impact, it was toward greater human rights abuse in interventions of
longer duration.
Rather than just assuming that we have explained as much as is possible,
we believe that there are other relationships and angles to be explored. We
caution against taking these results as verification of the extreme view of
Luttwak (1999) and others, who would say that humanitarian interventions
of almost any kind tend to make matters worse, by prolonging the
inevitable. Regarding US military actions, we know that during the Cold
War period, which constitutes most of this sample of data, though they
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might have been a consideration, human rights considerations were not
always a top priority of US foreign policymakers. Indeed, such concerns
were often sacrificed in the interest of larger, strategic objectives. Since the
end of the Cold War, however, these interests have become much more
important, and many uses of force have been undertaken primarily to confront
human rights problems. Such cases need to be analyzed in more depth
and with data for more recent years to provide us with a better picture of
how much improvement in human rights we have seen (if any) as a consequence
of military interventions since the end of the Cold War. Further,
this study does not examine the effects of a wide variety of interventions
undertaken by other countries, and by international governmental, and
non-governmental organizations. Further research should look at the effectiveness
of the variety of instruments used by the world community, in its
attempt to foster improvements in the respect for human rights.
If we can draw one lesson from these analyses, it is that promoting
human rights is difficult at best and fraught with complexities. While the
results do not necessarily speak to what these complexities are, we may
hazard a few guesses. First, there are practical difficulties. Military interventions
often result in instability and sometimes greater violence, especially
in their early stages, as institutions traditionally responsible for law
and order may be pushed aside, damaged or even done away with. This in
turn may well create a more permissive environment in which human
rights abuses may flourish. Second, there are cultural complexities
involved in advancing a human rights agenda on a society that may be at a
minimum unprepared, and at worst, hostile to the imposition of a new set
of moral and political values. The presence of the US military may inspire
even greater opposition to the transference of such values than had they
been promoted via other avenues, such as foreign aid, diplomacy, and the
media. Third, there are strategic considerations that may militate against
human rights improvements as US foreign policymakers may be more concerned
with establishing a stable, friendly government rather than one that
is protective of human rights, but unable to maintain law and order. Yet,
despite the complexities inherent in the promotion of human rights, there
may as yet be long-term improvements in many of the targeted nation.
With the passage of time that will bring us more information on the effects
of the post-Cold War interventions, we can begin to better understand the
extent to which these uses of force have improved human rights, or
whether the targeted nations would have been better off without such
intervention.
Notes
1 This portion of “The Annual Defense Report” is found at http://www.dtic.mil/
execsec/adr2000/chap1.html
2 The measurement of democracy is taken from the Polity IV dataset, courtsey of
the Polity IV project at the University of Maryland. Data is from the Polity IV
172
website at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. It is measured on
the 0–10 scale where “10” is the most democratic.
3 Human rights data are taken from the International Human Rights Study
Center website at http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/ courtesy of Steve Poe and Neal
Tate. The human rights measure is a 1–5 scale with greater values indicating
more repression of human rights to personal integrity.
4 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html
5 We use a pooled time series model with panel-corrected standard errors and a
lagged, endogenous variable to counter the effects of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.
6 Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 50) divide force levels into three broad groups: (1)
Major force level including at least one of the following: (a) two or more aircraft
carrier task groups; (b) more than one battalion ground unit; (c) one or more air
combat wings; (2) Standard force level including at least one of the following: (a)
one aircraft carrier task group; (b) a ground unit of no more than one battalion,
but larger than one company; (c) one or more air combat squadrons, but less
than one wing; (3) Minor force level including at least one of the following: (a)
naval units without aircraft carriers; (b) ground units of no more than one
company; (c) less than one air combat squadron.
7 Any US military intervention in which Blechman and Kaplan and the other
sources used to obtain data on the use of force list the deployment of units of the
US Army or US Marines are coded as a US use of force involving ground forces.
8 There were 110 instances of the use of force during the period under study. We
were able to obtain lengths for 87 cases, which ranged from one day to 2,734
days. We coded cases that were still ongoing at the end of 1996 as missing. Also
in some instances there was insufficient information to calculate the duration of
an event, and those were coded as missing. We also lost some of the cases as a
result of lagging this variable three years, leaving us with an N of 62. It should be
noted that for ease of statistical manipulation, only one intervention was
counted per country per year.
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