Role Theory, Foreign Policy Advisors, and U.S. Foreign Policymaking part 02

Role Theory and the Study of U.S. Foreign Policy
The above review of role theory literature was intended to provide a general background and context in which to view this broad and diverse perspective, as well as its potential usefulness to the study of U.S. foreign policy. The following section goes on to examine role theory research as applied to the field of U.S. foreign policy in terms of advisory roles/dynamics and foreign policymaking. From here, potentially fruitful avenues of research utilizing role theory—specifically the above six concepts—in the study of U.S. foreign policy can then be identified and discussed.
In Bruce Jentleson’s (1990) research, he contends that foreign policy decisions are to be explained in terms of the independent variable of the president’s belief system, as potentially mediated by the intervening variable of the senior advisory process. The core set of beliefs which the president brings to office (analytic, normative and instrumental components) establish the basic “propensities” for his administration’s foreign policy. The extent of the mediating effect of the senior advisory process is postulated to be a function of the degree and nature of unity among the president’s top advisors. Elizabeth Marvick was one of the first scholars to have suggested a formal typology of relationships linking leaders and advisers. She differentiates between “favorites” whose actions gratify affective aims (in some way they make the leader feel good) and “factotums” whose service is primarily instrumental (Marvick 1983).
Writing of his own experience as an adviser, Hedley Donovan (1981) suggests distinctions similar to Marvick’s in his discussion of “organic” and “artificially conceived” adviser types. An “organic” relationship flows out of a deep-rooted personal association or from a successful operational assignment in which the president comes to trust the judgments the adviser brings to his role. “Artificially conceived” advisers, on the other hand, generally serve a particular instrumental function and lack any deep affective ties to the president. Two other leader-adviser relationships are offered by Jerold Post (1993), who distinguishes between “sycophant” and “healthy self-object” relationships in his study of narcissism and political leadership. In this scheme, the sycophant provides support for the faltering self-esteem of the leader; that is, these advisers tell the leader what he wants to hear. By contrast, the “healthy self-object” relationship combines both functions—that is, keeping the leader accurately in touch with reality while at the same time shoring up his self-esteem.
Link and Glad (1994) build directly upon the works of Marvick and Post, delineating five advisory relation types: reality testing, bolstering, reality testing-bolstering (mixed), compensatory, and proxy. They contend that advisory types differ in the ways in which they respond to a president’s political and psychological needs. Reality testers are oriented to cues from the external environment rather than to the president'’ psychological drives and needs. Bolsters serve the function of sustaining the president psychologically in the performance of his role. Reality testing bolsters reconcile the president’s psychological propensities with the requirements of the external environment. Aides in this category may serve as reality testers in routine decisions or “normal time,” but shift to the mixed mode when the president is under great pressure. Those performing the proxy function, by contrast, serve as psychological delegates for the leader, often expressing for a president feelings or showing behavior which for one reason or another he must constrain. The compensatory function occurs when the adviser possesses traits or performs functions for the president in areas in which the president is weak or lacking.
Focusing specifically on the national security adviser (NSA), George (1980) examines the potential role conflict faced by the NSA due to the assumption of important roles—particularly since 1961—in addition to the NSA’s original role of custodian-manager. The acquisition of multiple role makes it likely that the NSA will experience role conflict that will eventually undermine the effectiveness with which he performs his basic custodial functions. “Once he becomes an adviser-advocate to the president as well as the custodian-manager, it will take a most exceptional person to continue to dispassionately oversee the flow of information and advice to the president; for to do so might well reduce his own influence as an adviser” (196-7). Similar conflicts with his custodial responsibilities arise when the NSA assumes the additional roles of policy spokesman and enforcer of policy, watchdog for the president’s power stakes, and operational duties such as diplomatic negotiations and mediation.
Bock and Clarke (1986) examine the NSA and the White House staff—from the Truman through the Reagan administrations—in order to partially fill the gap in the literature concerning the integration of domestic politics with national security policy at the highest level. They conclude that the potential for at least some tension between White House political aides and the NSA is built into their sometimes competitive functional responsibilities. What the aides may consider to be in the president’s best domestic political interests may be deemed by the NSA to be poor national security policy. Much of what tension has existed between White House political aides (and, infrequently, the president) and the NSA relates directly to the security assistant’s public visibility. If such visibility causes the aides, and perhaps the president, to believe that the NSA has become a popular public figure who, in the public’s eye, eclipses the president in national security affairs, intra-White House friction is probable (Bock & Clarke 1986: 271-2).
In addition to analyzing the role that national security advisers have played in the policymaking process, Mulcahy and Kendrick (1991) evaluate the utility of those roles for assisting the president in making his responsible decisions. They write that the NSA’s role has evolved since its inception, coming to rival and eclipse the State Department for dominance in foreign policymaking. Mulcahy and Kendrick develop an typology to describe different roles that have been played by NSAs in the past and that constitute the repertory of roles available to future assistants. These include the “administrator”, who has both low implementation and low policymaking responsibilities; the “coordinator”, who facilitates policymaking but is not an initiator of policy; the “counselor”, who functions in a largely personal relationship to the president, evaluating rather than simply presenting policy alternatives; and the “agent”, who combines the duties of a coordinator (directing a planning process) with those of a counselor (serving as a personal presidential adviser and advocate). As agent, the NSA dominates the process for formulating national security policy—making many decisions himself, advocating others—and acts as the primary presidential spokesman for foreign affairs. Mulcahy and Kendrick emphasize that the choice of a particular role from among those available is strictly determined by presidential preference. Similarly, an assistant’s success “will depend on adopting or adapting to whatever role best facilitates presidential preferences in managing national security. The personal resources that an NSA brings to his position will largely determine his success in fulfilling the president’s policymaking and managerial expectations” (263-4).
Kevin Mulcahy (1986) examines the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of recent secretaries of state to claim a privileged position as the presidential adviser on foreign policy. He focuses on Cyrus Vance and Alexander Haig, noting that Vance believed himself to be the rightful spokesman for American foreign policy but unfortunately ran afoul of an ambitious NSA (Brzezinski). Mulcahy also notes that Haig similarly entertained a conception of his office—he attempted to make himself the “vicar” of foreign policy—that no longer corresponded to the realities of national security policymaking. Mulcahy contends that “both should have realized that their persistent problems testified to the impossibility of their claims. Competition between the nation’s diplomatic chief and the president’s chief White House adviser for national security affairs had become endemic to the process of foreign policymaking” (280-1).
According to Korb (1991), the secretary of defense has had two main roles in the national security decision-making process: principal military adviser to the president and manager of the world’s largest bureaucracy. Yet in carrying out these functions, the secretary of defense has rivals both inside the department of defense (DOD)—the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who possess military expertise as well as the legal right of direct access to the president and concurrent membership on the national security council (NSC)—and outside the DOD—the NSA and the secretary of state. Korb contends that the manner in which secretaries of defense have carried out their main responsibilities depends on the following factors: their own background and experience; their tenure in office; the expectations of and their relationship with the presidents they have served; and the quality of the other key appointees (282-3). Korb argues that one needs to also look at the roles that defense secretaries have attempted to play within the DOD and the national security structure. If this role selection is congruent with their environment and backgrounds, their effectiveness will be enhanced. He develops a typology of defense secretaries in terms of their internal (active vs. passive) and external (generalist vs. functionalist) roles. In terms of their internal management styles, an active secretary of defense provides strong aggressive leadership in running the DOD, while a passive secretary allows the military services to run the department while he merely maintains the appearance of civilian control (283-4). In terms of having a substantial impact on governmentwide national security policy (external role), those who take an activist role in national security policy formulation can be classified as “generalists”, while those who are unable or unwilling to plan such a role can be classified as “functionalists” (288).
Cohen and Rosati (1998), who examine the role of the chief of staff in foreign policy, argue that there has occurred a “recent emergence of a new player in the foreign policy process—that of the White House chief of staff”. They state the parameters for the chief of staff’s responsibilities appear to have changed and broadened, beginning with Alexander Haig (during the last two years under Richard Nixon) and Hamilton Jordan (Jimmy Carter’s first chief of staff). Cohen and Rosati contend that the emergence of the chief of staff in foreign policy is the result of both an institutional response to ‘systemic’ change in the political and foreign policy environment—increasing global interdependence and decline of the imperial presidency—as well as a function of 'idiopathic' factors that exist within particular presidencies. In terms of the latter, the more open a president is to his chief of staff’s involvement in the foreign policy process, the more likely that this will indeed occur. In addition, the less dominant the role played by the national security adviser in foreign policy, the greater the likelihood that the chief of staff will play a role in foreign policymaking.

Potential Applications of Role Theory to the Study of Foreign Policy
The foregoing review of role theory literature—in general and as applied to the study of U.S. foreign policy—permits a discussion of some potentially significant avenues of research for role theory as applied to the study of U.S. foreign policy. This can contribute to overcoming some of the gaps in the literature and allow synthesis to occur. The following section, therefore, examines potentially fruitful avenues of research utilizing role theory—specifically the six concepts of role conflict, role expectations, role evolution, role change, role ambiguity, and role overload—in the study of foreign policy. Areas of greatest relevance include presidential foreign policy advisers’ role images/concepts, adviser group dynamics, and the implications of these for the foreign policy decision-making process.
One apparent gap in the literature concerns the spelling out of various role-sets (the set of different roles associated with a position) of individual foreign policy advisers beyond a basic typology of “active vs. passive.” George (1980) and Mulcahy & Kendrick (1991), for instance, have made strides in this direction regarding the various roles of the NSA, but little has been written to elucidate the possible roles of the secretaries of state and defense—two key advisers in the foreign policymaking process. Such research might further elucidate the role conceptions and conflicts of these advisers, shedding light on the nature of adviser group dynamics, which holds possible implications for the foreign policymaking process.
George (1980) argues that the NSA’s role overload has led to role conflict, but role conflict is also faced by the secretaries of state, defense, commerce, and treasury, who have the additional cabinet roles of overseeing departments. More systematic research into the role conflicts (multiple roles) faced by these advisers might shed light on how advisers resolve role conflict (possible strategies) and the consequences for adviser group dynamics and the foreign policymaking process. In addition, researching the sources of conflicting roles for each adviser may call for a multi-level analysis—societal, governmental, global—which adds more sophistication to the understanding of advisers’ role conceptions and adviser group dynamics. Thus, attempts to identify sources of role conflict experienced by foreign policy advisers can engender research at multiple levels of analysis, with important implications for the foreign policy decision-making process.
Another partial gap in the literature is the lack of focus on the evolution of roles of advisers during the course of an administration. Relevant questions to be pursued include the extent to which tenure impacts the role of an adviser, and the degree to which changes in advisory personnel affect the role of an adviser. The central task would be that of identifying factors which, to a greater or lesser degree, influence the evolution of an adviser’s role (if the role evolves at all), and the direction in which the role evolves. In doing so patterns may evolve, and comparison/contrasts can then be made across administrations, leading to potentially generalizable conclusions. By identifying the factors relevant to role evolution, greater understanding is permitted of an adviser’s role concept as well as the stability and fluidity of both an adviser’s role concept and adviser group dynamics. Such research would appear to hold important implications for the foreign policymaking process.
In addition, with the prevalence of intermestic issues, several advisory roles are deserving of greater scholarly attention. Though some research is beginning to focus on the foreign policy role of the chief of staff (Cohen & Rosati 1998), more study is needed on the varying roles of this position, including role overload, role ambiguity, and role evolution. Role overload can lead to conflicts with other advisers vying for influence, particularly the NSA and the secretary of state, with significant implications for the latter advisers’ role expectations, performance, and adviser group dynamics. Role ambiguity can lead to a condition in which expectations of the chief of staff are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior due to the additional foreign policy role of the chief of staff. This may result in heightened tensions among the top advisers due to a lack of guidance by the president. Attention to role evolution can shed light on whether the role of the chief of staff is going through a more temporary or more permanent kind of change, having implications for future holders of the office as well as for other adviser roles/dynamics. All the above also involve important implications for the foreign policy decision-making process, especially considering the central role played in general by the president’s chief of staff. Furthermore, all the above role concepts—role overload, role ambiguity, role evolution—are also applicable to the study of the relatively new position of the national economic adviser (NEA).
In considering the role of the NEA, one research question concerns the extent to which the NEA shows signs of role conflict with other top economic advisers due to role overload, similar to the case of the NSA vis-à-vis the secretary of state. The NEA does have functions paralleling the NSA, prompting this line of inquiry. Such research could elucidate the role expectations of the NEA and help explain the NEA’s role performance. All this holds significant implications for role expectations and performance of rival advisers as well as adviser group dynamics. In addition, a gap appears in the literature concerning the degree and sources of evolution in the role of the NEA since its creation in 1993. Typically, a new position undergoes some adjustments in the early stages, and research pertaining to role evolution of the NEA can indicate the direction of such role evolution, shedding light on the dynamic nature of the NEA’s role, with the accompanying implications for future NEAs, adviser group dynamics, and the foreign policymaking process.
Another apparent gap in the research concerns role expectations of cabinet-level secretarial leadership in the foreign policymaking process. Several presidents in recent times have entered office with expectations for such secretarial leadership, but eventually centralized the foreign policymaking process. In these instances, the relevant research questions involve the effects on the secretaries’ role conception, and the extent to which the secretaries’ role expectations were initially manifested (role performance). In addition, research would analyze the extent to which role expectations and role performance were adjusted once the policymaking process had been centralized. Such research can indicate patterns in the advisers’ roles and the role dynamic at work during such circumstances. Furthermore, the examination would pursue the implications of the above for adviser group dynamics as well as the foreign policymaking process.
A further application of role theory to the study of U.S. foreign policy involves the concept of role change. This concept is relevant in circumstances where an adviser has held a position in a previous administration. One question to pursue is the degree to which a pattern or link exists between an adviser’s present role conception/performance and his/her role conception/performance in a previous government position. A related line of inquiry is whether there are certain conditions or circumstances which inhibit, modify, or enable such a pattern. For example, does a previous governmental role assist a new adviser in learning and adapting to his/her new role, being more attuned to role cues and more effective at role conflict resolution? If so, why? Such findings can contribute to explaining—and possibly predicting—an adviser’s role concept/performance in an administration, with implications for adviser group dynamics and the foreign policymaking process. The above line of questioning also translates to situations in which advisers switch roles within an administration during the course of the administration.
Additional research which could fill a partial gap in the literature concerns role learning on the part of an adviser, or how he/she adapts to his or her role. Integral to such research are the role cues from other advisers in terms of what form the cues take, and how the cues are “communicated”. Understanding the forms and dynamics of such cues among actors can provide insight into an actor’s role conception/performance, as well as possible patterns among role cues. An obvious example in the past have been cues put forth by the NSA toward the secretary of state concerning who will have primary influence over the foreign policy process. However, what about cues—and possibly recurring patterns of cues—between other advisers and/or sets of advisers? To what extent do these cues provide guidelines for role behavior, and what are their style and substance? Such research can contribute to a better understanding of adviser group dynamics, including rivalry/alliance processes for influence in foreign policymaking.
In the theatrical analogy for role theory, significant similarities exist in the performances of actors taking the same part, no matter who the actors are. Thus, research could assess to what degree advisers’ role performances in the same role since post-World War II have been convergent or divergent, and why. For this endeavor, a multi-level analysis would seemingly be required due to the complexity of such a task. Convergence would lend support to the influence of role on an individual, while divergence would contravene such a conclusion for a potential variety of reasons. Either conclusion would warrant further investigation into the underlying forces and dynamics, as well as the overall implications for the usefulness of role theory for understanding and explaining U.S. foreign policy phenomena.
In terms of the drawbacks of the usefulness of role theory in studying U.S. foreign policy, the primary weakness appears to be individual characteristics (personality), which may at times be more consequential than the role he or she assumes. This points to a weakness of role theory, in that individual characteristics may have greater explanatory ability for the behavior of an adviser. However, the role still is significant, in that it presents opportunities as well as constraints on the actor. Therefore, a synthesis is called for between personality literature and role theory concerning foreign policy advisers. Such research would grant a more complete and sophisticated portrait of the adviser and adviser group dynamics, from which conclusions could be drawn, as well as further integration with societal, governmental, and global levels of analysis of the adviser and the foreign policymaking process.

Conclusion
Given such diverse perspectives within role theory, it is not surprising that role concepts have been applied to so many research topics. Such breadth demonstrates why disagreement has appeared on boundaries and assumptions of the field. Confusion and malintegration persist in role theory since authors continue to differ over definitions for the role concept, over assumptions they make about roles, and over explanations for role phenomena. One of the major reasons the domain of role theory is so difficult to define is that it takes on different identities depending in large part on the discipline of the writer. (Davis 1986: 582-3; Stryker & Stratham 1985: 311). The field of role has unfortunately come to be known as “role theory,” implying that there is actually more theory than in fact is the case. Indeed, there is no one grand “theory”. The term “theory”, when talking about role theory, is somewhat misleading. The perspective is more of an analytical framework or research orientation than a theory.
From the above discussion—as well as the review of role theory literature and foreign policy—role theory does indeed appear to be quite useful for understanding and explaining foreign policy advisers and their role images/concepts. Such usefulness also extends to understanding and explaining adviser group dynamics as well as the foreign policy decision making process. However, such understanding is inadequate without also addressing other bodies of research such as presidential leadership/management style, presidential characteristics, advisers’ characteristics, and the domestic/international environment. Furthermore, there are difficulties that need to realized and addressed in applying role theory to foreign policymakers. Role concepts are applied in varying fashions with differing meanings. The lack of consensus on the meaning of role and role theory in general throughout the social sciences means that applications to foreign policy will tend to be relatively infrequent, implicit, tangential, and sometimes inconsistent. In addition, role theory represents but one cog in the wheel of the study of foreign policymaking, but an indispensable one. Though role theory encompasses a wide array of thought, certain elements are quite applicable to the study of foreign policy, thereby indicating the need and opportunity for applications to various foreign policy phenomena.