Role Theory, Foreign Policy Advisors, and U.S. Foreign Policymaking part 01

Role Theory, Foreign Policy Advisors, and U.S. Foreign Policymaking

Steven J. Campbell
Department of Government & International Studies
University of Southern Carolina
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
________________________________________

Role theory, which offers a perspective that bridges social psychology, sociology, and anthropology, has generated interest among social scientists from many backgrounds, as well as confusion over its meaning and application. The role perspective arose coincidentally in several disciplines in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Its central concern has been with patterns of human conduct; with expectations, identities, and social positions; and with context and social structure as well as with individual response. The role perspective consists of a particular viewpoint regarding those factors presumed to be influential in governing human behavior, and it rests on a theatrical analogy:
When actors portray a character in a play, their performance is determined by the script, the director’s instructions, the performances of fellow actors, and reactions of the audience as well as by the acting talents of the players. Apart from differences between actors in the interpretation of their parts, the performance of each actor is programmed by all of these external factors; consequently, there are significant similarities in the performances of actors taking the same part, no matter who the actors are (Biddle & Thomas 1979: 4).
One can take this analogy into real life, using some of the terms of role theory. Individuals in society occupy positions, and their role performance in these positions is determined by social norms, demands, and rules; by the role performances of others in their respective positions; by those who observe and react to the performance; and by the individual’s particular capabilities and personality. The social “script” may be as constraining as that of a play, but it frequently allows more options; the “director” is often present in real life as a supervisor, parent, teacher, or coach; the “audience” in life consists of all those who observe the position member’s behavior; the position member’s “performance” in life, as in the play, is attributable to one’s familiarity with the “part,” one’s personality and personal history in general, and more significantly, to the “script” which others define in so many ways. In essence, the role perspective assumes, as does the theater, that performance results from the social prescriptions and behavior of others, and that individual variations in performance, to the extent that they do occur, are expressed within the framework created by these factors (Biddle & Thomas 1979: 4).
Since role theory encompasses such a wide array of work, there is no cohesive body of thought or research comprising role theory, but rather many different strains loosely grouped together under the rubric of role theory. This represents more a general orientation or approach than a theory (Sarbin & Allen 1968: 488-89). Though certain elements within role theory have been applied to the study of foreign policy, relatively few have done so explicitly, and there is room for further application.
With this in mind, the main purpose of the paper is to review the literature on role theory and analyze to what extent it is useful for understanding and explaining foreign policy phenomena. Areas of greatest relevance include presidential foreign policy advisers’ role images/concepts, adviser group dynamics, and the implications of these for the foreign policy decision-making process. Certain strains in role theory can be useful for this endeavor in terms of filling gaps in the literature as well as synthesizing with current research. By utilizing these role theories from the fields of sociology and psychology, more bridges can be built between these disciplines and political science, contributing to research in the area of political psychology as applied to U.S. foreign policy.
To provide a general background and context in which to view role theory and its various elements, the paper first provides a review of the general literature on role theory throughout the social sciences. This will demonstrate the wide variety of perspectives that exist within role theory, and will set the scene for the subsequent confusion, applications of fuzzy concepts, and the relative dearth of role theory research in the study of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, several role theory concepts deemed most fruitful for further research in U.S. foreign policy are discussed. Second, role theory literature as applied to the study of U.S. foreign policy is reviewed, specifically as applied to foreign policy advisory roles and dynamics. Third, by conducting such a review, difficulties are discussed as well as potentially significant avenues of research utilizing role theory—particularly six role theory concepts—in the study of U.S. foreign policy. This may contribute to overcoming some of the gaps in the literature and allow synthesis to occur, allowing a richer explanation of advisers’ role concept/expectations and adviser group dynamics, including the implications of these for U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Finally, the implications of the value of role theory for the larger study of foreign policy are addressed.

Review of Role Theory Literature
Various sources have defined a role as “a patterned sequence of learned actions or deeds performed by a person in an interaction situation” (Sarbin 1954: 225); “a particular set of norms that is organized about a function” (Bates & Harvey 1975: 106); “a comprehensive pattern for behavior and attitude” (Turner 1979: 124); and “behavior referring to normative expectations associated with a position in a social system” (Allen & van de Vliert 1984a: 3). These definitions overlap, but each adds one or more conditions not given in the others, leading to confusion over how to conceptualize or study events that do not meet these conditions.
In attempting to integrate the various elements and conceptualizations in role theory, Bruce Biddle (1986: 67) writes that “role theory is a science concerned with the study of behaviors that are characteristic of persons within contexts and with various processes that presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those behaviors.” Role theory explains role by presuming that persons are members of social positions and hold expectations for their own behaviors and those of other persons. In earlier research, Biddle noted the term “role” had come to mean a “behavioral repertoire characteristic of a person or a position; a set of standards, descriptions, norms, or concepts held for the behaviors of a person or social position; or (less often) a position itself” (Biddle 1979: 4). The concept of role, therefore, provides a convenient “linkage between individual behavior and social structure” (Biddle & Thomas 1966: 7).
Early proponents of role concept
Early proponents of the role concept differed in the assumptions they were willing to make about it. George Mead (1934), a sociologist, introduced the concept of “role taking” and focused on its significance in the development of an individual’s self-concept. He wrote that people lay the foundation for a sense of who they are by identifying with significant others, internalizing others’ attitudes as their own, and seeing themselves as others see them. Mead’s research emphasized interaction between individuals via symbolic behaviors (e.g., verbal and nonverbal language) that function as stimuli. While examining problems of interaction, the self, and socialization, Mead employed the concept of “role taking,” along with such related ideas as the “generalized other,” the “self,” the “I” and “me,” and “audience.”
Joseph Moreno (1934) introduced the use of “role playing” as a therapeutic technique to be used for both the learning of new behaviors and to facilitate clients’ ability to understand another’s perspective. With regard to the concept of role, Moreno distinguished three categories: “(a) psychosomatic roles, as the sleeper, the eater, the walker; (b) psychodramatic roles as a mother,a teacher,a christian, etc.; and (c) social roles, them mother, the son, the daughter, the teacher, the Christian, etc.” He also argued that the genesis of roles goes through two stages: role-perception and role enactment (Moreno 1934: 81).
Ralph Linton, the anthropologist, and Robert K. Merton, the sociologist, were more concerned about the relationship between the social structure itself and the ways in which persons fulfilled their socially designated obligations. Linton (1936) distinguished between the static aspects of role behavior—that is, the positions or statuses designated by social systems—and their dynamic aspects—that is, the patterned behaviors, or roles, expected of and enacted by those who occupied them. Linton conceived of persons as enacting one role for each of the many statuses they occupied. Merton (1957) observed that there were actually a set of different roles—that is, a role-set—potentially associated with each status. Together, their contributions produced an awareness of the myriad ways in which the behaviors people enact in interaction with others are influenced by the positions they occupy in society and vary as they interact with different persons.
From the above discussion, the diversity of conceptualizations within role theory are clearly evident even from the works of early proponents. Thus, a general review of role theory literature proves problematic due to widely varying conceptualizations of role theory and its numerous applications to differing contexts. In order to make sense of the literature, the paper utilizes five perspectives in role theory identified by Biddle (1986) in order to structure the review. These five perspectives are: 1) functional role theory; 2) symbolic interactionist role theory; 3) structural role theory; 4) organizational role theory; and 5) cognitive role theory.
Functional role theory
In general, functional role theory has focused on the characteristic behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system. “Roles” are conceived as the shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain these behaviors. Actors in the social system have presumably been taught these norms and may be counted upon to conform to norms for their own conduct and to sanction others for conformity to norms applying to the latter. The functional approach to role theory began with the work of Linton (1936) but was not formalized until the publications of Parsons (1951; Parsons & Shils 1951). A more recent work by Bates & Harvey (1975) views social structures as collections of designated social positions, the shared norms of which govern differentiated behaviors. Some of the norms applying to a given position govern general conduct, but others govern only relationships between a focal position and a specific counter position. Among the latter, “roles” are those that apply to the accomplishment of specific functions.
Symbolic Interactionist role theory
Symbolic interactionists stress the roles of individual actors, the evolution of roles through social interaction, and various cognitive concepts through which social actors understand and interpret their own and tours’ conduct. Roles are thought to reflect norms, attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as understood by the actors. Interest in the role concept among symbolic interactionists began with Mead (1934) and was further explored by Sarbin (1954). Sarbin asserted that social roles have an existence independent of the individual, but the role is still intimately linked to a particular individual’s way of performing it. He also introduced the concept of the “organismic dimension”, stressing varying degrees of proximity between the role and the self, proposing seven different levels, ranging from a situation where the self and the role are remote from each other to a level where role and self are united in deep trance. The self thus acquires significance from the way the role is understood, performed, and taken over from the other party.
More recent contributors have discussed the development of evaluated role identities (Gordon 1976) as well as how the changing of roles alters one’s goals and self-conceptions (Gordon & Gordon 1982). In addition, Turner examined role learning (1974), the role and the person (1978), and the effect of others’ responses on interpretation of role behavior (Turner & Shosid 1976). Furthermore, Lopata (1991: argues that role theory, especially when applied to sets of relations between a social person and participants in a social circle rather than to expected or even actual behavior of one individual conforming to demands of a position, can revitalize an examination of social life.
Structural role theory
In structural role theory, little attention is given to norms or other expectations for conduct. Instead, attention is “focused on ‘social structures,’ conceived as stable organizations of sets of persons (called ‘social positions’ or ‘statuses’) who share the same, patterned behaviors (‘roles’) that are directed towards other sets of persons in the structure” (Biddle 1986: 72-3). Such concepts lead to formal discussions of various concerns including social networks, kinships, role sets, exchange relationships, comparison of forms of social systems, and the analysis of economic behaviors. Linton’s (1936) early statement of role concepts influenced anthropologists and others interested in social structure (see Levy 1952; Nadel 1957).
Representing a slight variation within structural role theory, the structural-analytical approach is concerned with analyzing the different roles of a social unit. Attention is not directed at the role performances of different individuals, but rather at a description of roles as social quantities. It is argued that every social group consists of a collection of roles, which must be present to enable the group to exist and develop. It then becomes important to study different leader roles, functional roles, pedagogical roles, sex roles, status roles, and so on. It is simply a question of the division of labor that must exist within a given group for everything to function (Holm 1997: 74).
Organizational role theory
However insightful the work of functionalists, symbolic interactionists, and structuralists, most empirical research in the role field has come from the two remaining perspectives identified by Biddle: organizational and cognitive role theory. Organizational role theory represents a perspective among researchers interested in the roles of formal organizations. Their efforts have built a version of role theory focused on social systems that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical. Roles in such organizations are assumed to be associated with identified social positions and to be generated by normative expectations, but norms may vary among individuals and may reflect both the official demands of the organizations and the pressures of informal groups. Given multiple sources for norms, individuals are often subjected to role conflicts in which they must contend with antithetical norms for their behavior. Such role conflicts produce strain and must be resolved if the individual is to be happy and the organization is to prosper (Biddle 1986: 73).
Organizational role theory may be said to have begun with the seminal works of Gross et al (1958) and Kahn et al (1964). More recent research includes articles on role conflict resolution (van de Vliert 1981) and an edited work seeking to extend the theory to the phenomena of role transition (Allen & van de Vliert 1984b). The latter work, in particular, presents theory and application papers focused on problems generated when the actor must cope with changes in social position or expectations of the actor’s position. Such experiences typically cause strain, and the core of the theory concerns variables that affect the actor’s choice of strategies for coping with the situation.
Cognitive role theory
The remaining bulk of empirical role research has largely been associated with cognitive social psychology. As a rule, this work has focused on relationships between role expectations and behavior. Attention has been given to social conditions that give rise to expectations, to techniques for measuring expectations, and to the impact of expectations on social conduct. Many cognitive role theorists have also concerned themselves with the ways in which a person perceives the expectations of others and with the effects of those perceptions on behavior (Biddle 1986: 74).
Role expectations or prescriptions (used interchangeably) are actions or qualities that are expected from the occupant of the position. Role expectations have two sources: the beliefs the actor holds about what his/her position requires him/her to do, and the beliefs about the actor’s position held by others. More often they are “a conglomeration of the actor’s own (ego’s) role conceptions as well as those of other actor’s (alter’s)” (Jonsson & Westerlund 1982: 125). Unlike most cognitive role theorists, Biddle (1979) assumes that role expectations can appear simultaneously in at least three modes of thought: norms, preferences, and beliefs. These modes of expectation are learned through somewhat different experiences. However, each may (or may not) be shared with others in a given context, each can affect behavior, and all may be involved in generating a role.
Within cognitive role theory, four subfields are identifiable, beginning with Moreno’s (1934) early discussion of “role playing”, which has been found an effective way to produce changes in expectations (Janis & Mann 1977). A second subfield was stimulated by Sherif’s (1936) early work on group norms but was given additional impetus by the subsequent work of others on group norms and the roles of leaders and followers (see Moreland & Levine 1982, Rutte & Wilke 1984, Hollander 1985). A third subfield has focused on theories of anticipatory role expectations originally suggested by Rotter (1954) and Kelly (1955). Emphasis within this tradition has not been upon normative expectations; instead, expectations have been conceived as beliefs about likely conduct, and researchers have examined both subjects’ beliefs about their own behavior and those beliefs that they attribute to other persons (Carver & Scheier 1981; Tschudi & Rommetveit 1982). Finally, a fourth subfield has appeared as research on “role taking,” stimulated by contributions of Mead (1934) and Piaget (1926).
Key concepts in role theory
Several key concepts in role theory are prevalent throughout the literature, and have been mentioned in the above review. In particular, six provide potentially significant paths of research concerning U.S. foreign policy advisers and policymaking. Four concepts of primary interest are “role conflict,” “role expectations,” “role evolution,” and “role change.” Two further concepts warranting consideration are “role ambiguity” and “role overload,” which are briefly mentioned below.
The first concept, “role conflict,” is normally defined as the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behavior of a person. In such a case, the person will be subjected to conflicting pressures, will suffer stress, will have to “resolve” the problem by adopting some form of coping behavior, and both the person and the system will be disrupted. However, role conflict is only one of several structural conditions that are thought to cause problems in social systems. Others include “role ambiguity” (a condition in which expectations are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior) and “role overload” (when the person is faced with too many expectations). Each of these conditions may produce stress for the individual (Abramis 1994; Biddle 1986).
Secondly, “role expectations” are a combination of the actor’s own role conceptions and those of other actors. Unless alter’s role conceptions constitute highly authoritative and very specific prescriptions, there is seldom a one-to-one correspondence between ego’s and alter’s role conceptions (Walker 1979: 177). Role ambiguity may thus result from ego’s and alter’s divergent role expectations (Biddle 1979: 195). In addition, Biddle (1986: 81) concludes that the evidence suggests persons often conform to expectations that are held by others, are attributed to others, or are held by the person for his or her conduct.
Thirdly, “role evolution” involves the processes and dynamics by which a role is adjusted and modified. Roles may “develop” to varying degrees and speeds depending on a variety of factors, and such evolution can have significant implications.
Finally, “role change” can be significant due to the implications of adjustments made by actors in assuming new roles. Since actors have previous experiences, backgrounds, and skills, they may likely bring to their roles expectations, however realistic, which can impact other actors and the foreign policymaking process.

WILL THE REAL TURKEY PLEASE STAND UP? TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS*

(Draft. Do not quote without permission. Comments are always welcome)

Balkan Devlen, PhD
Izmir University of Economics

*Prepared for the WISC 2008, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

INTRODUCTION
Since November 2002 the Turkish government is headed by Justice and Development Party (better known with is Turkish acronym AKP) that has Islamist roots. From time to time AKP’s Islamist legacy created tensions in domestic arena between the government and civil-military bureaucracy, which is know for its staunch secularism. Examining whether ideological differences between the AKP government and civil-military bureaucracy is carried over to the foreign policy issues such as EU membership, the Cyprus issue, and the developments in Iraq is the main focus of this study. In other words, the main question I ask in this study is whether the Turkish state speaks with one voice with regards to foreign policy issues or whether there are notable differences among the key players such as the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of General Staff?
At this stage of this study I examine the belief systems of the key decision-makers in the Turkish foreign policy establishment by using operational code analysis in order to answer this question. I use foreign policy speeches by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then the Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gul, and then the Chief of General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok from the years 2005 and 2006 in order to construct and compare their operational codes.
It is important to point out that this is a very much work in progress as I gather more data from earlier periods as well as 2007 to be able to construct more detailed profiles of these decision-makers and disaggregate their respective beliefs about different foreign policy domains such as accession to the EU, the Cyprus problem, the situation in Iraq etc. Therefore, the current results and the discussion are tentative and should not be seen as conclusive profiles of these decision-makers.

METHODOLOGY
Operational code analysis focuses on the beliefs of political leaders as causal mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969, 1979; Walker 1983, 1990; Walker and Schafer 2007). It was originally developed by Leites (1951, 1953) to analyze the decision-making style of the Soviet Politburo and later developed and refined by George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1977), and Walker (1983, 1990). According to the operational code construct leader’s cognitive schemata or belief system has two components. The first set is the five philosophical beliefs about the political universe in which the leader finds himself and the nature of the “other” he faces in this environment. Second, there are five instrumental beliefs that represent the image of “self” in this political universe and the best strategies and tactics one could employ to achieve one’s ends (George 1979; Walker 1990). Taken together they “explain diagnostic and choice propensities of the agents who make foreign policy decisions” (Walker and Schafer forthcoming). The philosophical and instrumental beliefs are the answers to the following questions developed by George (1969, 1979):
The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code are:
P-1. What is the ‘‘essential’’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essen-
tially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s
political opponents?
P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental val-
ues and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this
score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4. How much ‘‘control’’ or ‘‘mastery’’ do self and other have over historical
development? What is self and other’s role in ‘‘moving’’ and ‘‘shaping’’ history
in the desired direction?
P-5. What is the role of ‘‘chance’’ in human affairs and in historical development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code are:
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4. What is the best ‘‘timing’’ of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
P-1, I-1, and P-4 are considered master beliefs as they are key in determining the answers for the rest. The central assumption of operational code analysis is that individual leaders matter in shaping the foreign policy of states and that the beliefs they have might act as causal mechanisms in understanding why they chose a certain foreign policy decision. Beliefs could have three idealized effects if they are going to act as causal mechanisms in the explanation of foreign policy decisions. First, beliefs can have mirroring effects, which suggests that the environment is highly transparent and they reflect the situation accurately and influence action. In this instance, they are necessary conditions for action. Second, beliefs can have steering effects, which suggests that even if they do not reflect reality they can still be the basis for action. In such a situation, beliefs are both necessary and sufficient conditions for action. Third, beliefs can manifest learning effects as they may change over time. This learning effect influence future actions depending on whether they converge or diverge from reality (Walker and Schafer 2004:3). Walker and Schafer (2005:4) clearly posit the main question, “when and how do the beliefs of leaders act as pivotal causal mechanisms in explaining and anticipating the processes of strategic interaction between states at several levels of decision: moves, tactics, strategies, and policy preferences?”. To put it more simply, when and how does cognition affect decision-making?
Holsti (1977) developed an operational code typology by trying to answer George’s (1969) questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He developed six types of operational codes (A, B, C, D, E, F), which are later reduced to four (A, B, C, DEF) by Walker (1983, 1990). This typology is based on the nature (temporary vs. permanent) and the source (individual/society/international system) of conflict in the political world, deduced from the answers to P-1, I-1, and P-4. (Walker and Schafer forthcoming). In the revised typology the pessimists (DEF types), who see the conflict as permanent, are lumped together regardless of the source of that conflict. Walker (1983) argues that such a move is justified because there are no discernable differences in the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs of DEF types so they could be seen as a single ideal type. Optimists, however, differ in how they see the source of the conflict: misperceptions by the individuals (A), societal institutions (B), or anarchic nature of the international system (C). Those differences have an impact on the rest of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Walker et al. 1998). The following table represents this typology:
TYPE A

Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and Miscommunication. A
“conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.
Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit TYPE C

Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible, other resources than military capabilities are useful.


Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit
Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature
(D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy
(F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.
TYPE DEF Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit

Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.
TYPE B
Table 1. Contents of the Revised Holsti Operational Code Typology.Instrumental beliefs are in bold, and philosophical beliefs are not. Source: Walker (1983, 1990).

Contemporary operational code analysis uses an automated content analysis system called Verbs In Context System (VICS), introduced by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998). VICS focuses on the verbs in the leader’s public statements and their attributions regarding exercise of power to the Self and Others to construct quantitative indices that correspond to the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in Table 1 (Walker and Schafer forthcoming). The VICS indices for the master beliefs, P-1 (nature of the political universe), I-1 (strategic approach to goals), and P-4 (ability to control historical development), are mapped on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and horizontal (P-4) axes in Table 1 to locate leader’s image of the Self and Other in one of the four quadrants. The locations for Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b) leads to predictions regarding strategic preferences over the goals of settle, submit, dominate and deadlock (Walker and Schafer forthcoming). Table 2 provides details about the calculation of VICS indices.






PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
Elements Index Interpretation

P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL %Positive minus %Negative +1.0 friendly to
UNIVERSE (Image of Others) Transitive Other Attributions -1.0 hostile
P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 optimistic to
VALUES (Optimism/ Pessimism) Other Attributions divided by 3 –1.0 pessimistic
P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE (Predict- 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 predictable
ability of Others Tactics) Variation** for Other Attribu- to 0.0 uncertain
tions
P-4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) Attributions 1.0 high to 0.0
(Locus of Control) [Self plus Other Attributions] low self control
P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of 1 minus [Political Future x 1.0 high role
Control) Historical Development Index] to 0.0 low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
Elements Index Interpretation

I-1. APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction %Positive minus %Negative Self +1.0 high coop-
of Strategy) Attributions eration to –1.0 high
conflict
I-2. PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 high coop-
of Tactics) Self Attributions divided by 3 eration to –1.0 high
conflict
I-3. RISK ORIENTATION (Predicta- 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 risk accept-
bility of Tactics) Variation for Self Attributions ant to 0.0 risk
averse
I-4. TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibil- 1 minus Absolute Value [%X 1.0 high to 0.0
bility of Tactics) minus %Y Self Attributions] low shift propensity
a. Coop v. Conf Tactics Where X = Coop and Y = Conf
b. Word v. Deed Tactics Where X = Word and Y = Deed
I-5. UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise Percentages for Exercise of +1.0 very frequent
of Power) Power Categories a through f to 0.0 infrequent
a. Reward a's frequency divided by total
b. Promise b's frequency divided by total
c. Appeal/Support c's frequency divided by total
d. Oppose/Resist d's frequency divided by total
e. Threaten e's frequency divided by total
f. Punish f 's frequency divided by total
Table. 2. Verbs in Context Belief Indices in a Leader’s Operational Code
All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between 1.0 and þ 1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications’’ (Watson and McGaw, 1980:88).

Walker and Schafer (2007) further refined preference orderings based on the key operational code indices and developed a “theory of inferences about preferences”. The inferences are made by comparing the leader’s key operational code scores (P-1, I-1, and P-4) with a norming sample of world leaders. When the index scores lie above (below) this norm, the index is considered positive (negative) for the purposes of inferring preferences. For the P-4 index, a norming range of one standard deviation was set, and the index is interpreted by looking at whether the score is within one standard deviation of the norming mean or outside of it. Therefore, it is possible to construct the subjective games of the political leaders once we calculate their operational codes. However in this study I will not attempt to do such a thing for two reasons. First, the purpose of this study is not so much to predict specific behavior of the key decision-makers of the Turkish foreign policy elite in specific strategic episodes but to compare their belief systems with each other. Second, the hand-coded scores cannot easily be compared to the computer-coded scores thus we cannot use the norming group reliably in this instance. Therefore, the construction of subjective games of the Turkish foreign policy elite should be left for future research.


DATA AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
I used a collection of speeches, interviews, and press conferences by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Hilmi Ozkok from the years 2005 and 2006 to analyze their operational codes. After sorting out foreign policy related texts, I used the texts that contain at least 20 coded verbs (as suggested by Walker and Schafer 2007:44) in the analysis. Then I chose ten speech acts from Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul each randomly for analysis. I could only found one long speech and one interview for Hilmi Ozkok for that time frame therefore I coded both of them. Both speech acts yielded more than the minimum amount of verbs. All speech acts were hand-coded, therefore the results below cannot be compared to norming group scores which are computer coded (see Walker and Schafer 2007:43-45).
According to the analysis Erdogan has a benign view of the political universe (P-1: 0.33) and places the Other in Quadrant A (P-1: 0.33 and P-4b: 0.34). Erdogan’s scores suggest a cooperative strategic orientation with significantly greater control over historical developments compared to his image of the Other (I-1: 0.45 and P-4a: 0.66), which places him in the Quadrant C. Gul’s view of the political universe and the Other within is conflictual (P-1: -0.18 and P-4b: 0.27) which places the Other in Quadrant DEF in the revised Holsti typology. Gul’s self image other hand suggests a cooperative strategic orientation with a high degree of control over historical developments (I-1: 0.56 and P-4a: 0.73), which places him the C Quadrant.. Hilmi Ozkok’s operational code reveals a conflictual view of the political universe and the adversary (P-1: -0.13 and P-4b: 0.55), which places the Other in B Quadrant. His strategic orientation on the other hand is still cooperative but with lesser control over historical developments (I-1: 0.26 and P-4a: 0.45), which places him in A Quadrant. These scores are plotted in the figure below. For P-4 scores 0.50 is taken as the cut off point to determine relative control:
Recep Tayyip Erdogan = RTE, Abdullah Gul = Gul, Hilmi Ozkok = Ozkok, Self = (S), Other = (O).



DISCUSSION
The results of the preliminary analysis suggest that the Turkish foreign policy elite share a relatively common strategic orientation despite their different beliefs about the nature of the political universe. However, before proceeding to discuss their differences and similarities, first I will discuss each decision-makers’ operational code in more detail.
Erdogan has type A philosophical beliefs which are associated with a cooperative worldview. Leaders with type A philosophical beliefs tend to see miscommunication and misunderstanding as the roots of the conflict in international system. They believe that opponents would respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Erdogan also attributes low level of control over historical developments to his opponents, believing that he has the ability to shape the course of the events and can persuade his opponents to follow his lead. His instrumental beliefs and his sense of high level of control places makes him a type C leader. Leaders with type C instrumental believes tend to pursue their goals in a non-conflictual way and stresses shared norms, negotiations, and compromise instead of military methods. Erdogan’s belief in his control over historical developments also suggests that he would develop more ambitious plans but would control his risk by limiting the means rather than ends he pursued. In other words, Erdogan’s operational code suggests that he believed that in a world that is rather cooperative and in which the opponents would respond in kind to your actions, a leader with the ability to control historical developments can devise ambitious plans and could carry them out by using rather cooperative means to achieve them as using conflictual means would be risky.
Gul has type DEF philosophical beliefs which subscribes to a more conflictual worldview in which the conflict is permanent, whatever the cause of it might be. This is the typical realist view of the world that is based on power relations. It also suggest prudence and caution in world politics. He also attributes a relatively low level of control to his opponents. Gul’s instrumental beliefs and his relatively high sense of control over historical developments places him in the C Quadrant. Therefore, he shares similar strategic orientation with Erdogan, although Gul has even more cooperative orientation and his sense of control is even higher than Erdogan. This is interesting particularly because of his philosophical beliefs point towards a world of conflict. It suggests that Gul believes himself to be an idealist, a powerful, persuasive idealist nevertheless, in a realist world. Unlike Erdogan who sees a benign world, Gul has no such illusions but still chose cooperation over conflict in his policies believing that he, in the end, could control the course of history. He would take advantage of the opponents when the opportunity is present but would avoid escalation if possible.
Ozkok’s philosophical beliefs points towards a conflictual world in which the opponents have greater control over historical developments. Type B philosophical beliefs suggest that appeasement and miscalculation are the main causes of war. The opponents act rationally and could be deterred. His instrumental beliefs on the other hand suggest a type A leader who would pursue shared interests using flexible strategies and avoiding escalation whenever possible. In other words, a type A leader believes in negotiation and compromise and refrain from early use of force. It suggests that Ozkok’s belief system is largely in line with Ataturk’s dictum “Peace at Home, Peace Abroad”. Considered together with his philosophical beliefs, his instrumental beliefs point towards a strategy of rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior and avoidance of escalatory behavior in international relations. This seems to be in line with Ozkok’s public persona of being relatively ‘dovish’ compared to other Turkish military leaders.
How do three decision-makers stand in relation to one another? Bearing in mind that this is a research in progress and the results are quite tentative, I think three observations are in order. First, all three decision-makers seem to have different views of the world. While Erdogan’s view of the world is relatively cooperative, both Gul and Ozkok have conflictual images of the political universe. Interestingly, Gul has even more conflictual image of the world compared to Ozkok. This finding suggests that Turkish foreign policy elite do not share a common view of the international system. Furthermore, Gul as the Foreign Minister is closer to Hilmi Ozkok, rather than Erdogan in his diagnosis of the world. So the apparent political ideological differences (Islamist vs. Secular) do not account for the divergence between Erdogan and Gul. One explanation might be that Gul as the Foreign Minister also represents the bureaucracy of the foreign ministry and that is reflected in his speeches. We need further data to be more confident about this interpretation however.
Second, despite their differences in philosophical beliefs, all three leaders have a cooperative strategic orientation. Erdogan and Gul have very similar instrumental beliefs as both of them are type C leaders but Ozkok also has a cooperative orientation as a type A leader. This suggests that despite their differences in their views of the nature of the international system, the Turkish foreign policy elite share a common belief in the utility of cooperative strategies in achieving one’s political goals. Here I have to note that the majority of the speech acts that are used up to this point of the research are mainly about three topics; the accession talks with the EU, the Iranian nuclear program, and the situation in Iraq. Although I have not conducted a separate analysis for each domain due to the insufficient amount of data, this aggregate data of three very different foreign policy issue tentatively suggest a generally cooperative attitude on the part of the Turkish foreign policy elite. In other words, we can speculate that Turkish foreign policy elite speak with similar voices indeed even if they are not identical. Naturally, further analysis, data collection, and if possible comparison with computer-coded operational codes are needed to move this explanation from the realm of speculation to the realm of solid scientific claim.
Lastly, both Erdogan and Gul have a relatively high sense of control over historical developments compared to Ozkok. Although comparison with computer-coded data might be misleading I just would like to point out that the P-4a for the norming group is 0.21 while Erdogan and Gul have 0.66 and 0.73 respectively. Even with a possible margin of error among hand-coded and computer-coded data this is quite a bit difference. On the other hand, Ozkok is more closer to an average world leader compared the other two. Belief in the ability to control historical developments is generally associated with grandeur and ambitious plans and might lead to great political victories or disastrous defeats depending on the extent which one’s beliefs correspond to the reality. Therefore, we can expect that Ozkok would have followed more prudent policies compared to Erdogan and Gul, while the latter two might be tempted to play riskier political gambles.


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